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Lewisbey v. Corunjal — Magistrate judge recommends allowing two religious-freedom claims to proceed while dismissing the rest

Reported / Citable

Case
David Lewisbey v. Michael D. Corunjal, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Abilene Division
Judge
John R. Parker
Date Decided
June 29, 2026
Docket No.
1:24-cv-00026
Topics
Religious Freedom; Bivens Claims; Prisoner Rights; Judicial Screening

Background

David Lewisbey, a former federal inmate at FCI Big Spring, sued numerous prison employees in their personal capacities for monetary damages. His principal allegations concerned his placement in the Special Housing Unit following a drug-related disciplinary charge that was later expunged, interference with his Islamic religious practices during Ramadan, and delays in obtaining custom orthotics and appropriate athletic shoes for chronic foot pain.

Among other things, Lewisbey alleged that prison personnel repeatedly served him pork, delivered Ramadan meals late or not at all, and prevented him from participating in the Night of Determination prayer. Because he filed the case while incarcerated and proceeded in forma pauperis, Magistrate Judge John R. Parker screened the complaint and Lewisbey’s questionnaire responses under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.

The Court’s Holding

The magistrate judge recommended that Lewisbey’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims based on repeatedly being served pork survive screening against Cully Stearns, FNU Barnes, S. Facchinello, Herbert Walker, E. Walker, and Hector Lozano. He also recommended allowing the RFRA claim against Facchinello for allegedly preventing Lewisbey from participating in the Night of Determination prayer to proceed. At the screening stage, those allegations plausibly described substantial burdens on Lewisbey’s religious exercise.

The magistrate judge recommended dismissing all other claims with prejudice. The allegations about cold or late Ramadan meals did not plausibly establish a substantial religious burden. The Fifth Amendment disciplinary-process claims, First Amendment free-exercise and retaliation claims, and Eighth Amendment medical-care claims either presented impermissible new Bivens contexts or otherwise failed to state a claim. The proposed findings also concluded that sovereign-immunity exceptions barred any Federal Tort Claims Act theory involving detained property or mishandled mail, and that the court could not review the Bureau of Prisons’ resolution of Lewisbey’s Small Claims Act request.

Because Lewisbey had already supplemented his allegations through a court questionnaire without curing the defects, the magistrate judge concluded that further amendment would be futile. The matter was transferred back to the district judge after preliminary screening, and the recommendations remained subject to objections and the district judge’s review.

Key Takeaways

  • Allegations that prison officials repeatedly served a Muslim inmate pork and denied a significant Ramadan prayer observance were sufficient to state RFRA claims at screening.
  • The magistrate judge declined to extend Bivens to prison disciplinary due-process claims, First Amendment claims, or the medical-treatment allegations presented here.
  • The ruling is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, not a final merits judgment, and the surviving defendants may still contest the RFRA claims.

Why It Matters

The recommendation illustrates RFRA’s importance for federal prisoners seeking personal-capacity damages for burdens on religious exercise when no First Amendment damages remedy is available under Bivens. It also reflects the increasingly narrow scope of Bivens, even where a prisoner invokes constitutional provisions addressed in earlier Supreme Court cases.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the need to distinguish between religious accommodations that are merely inadequate and conduct that plausibly pressures an inmate to violate sincerely held beliefs. It also shows that property-loss claims involving federal prison officials may encounter jurisdictional barriers under both the FTCA’s statutory exceptions and the Small Claims Act.

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