Reported / Citable
Background
Pro se plaintiff Kerry Ray Lampkin, Jr. alleged that he was acquitted in a criminal case but that defendants failed to update their records to reflect the acquittal. He claimed the alleged failure caused reputational, economic, and procedural injuries, including housing denials and lost employment opportunities.
Lampkin brought four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, invoking procedural due process, substantive due process, deliberate indifference under Monell, and access to remedy. Bexar County and the Bexar County Risk Management Department moved to dismiss. In responding, Lampkin also referenced an alleged Texas expunction order and made a bare request for leave to amend if his complaint were deficient.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Kelly G. Stephenson recommended granting the motion to dismiss. The recommendation concluded that the Bexar County Risk Management Department is a non-jural county department that lacks capacity to be sued. It further concluded that Lampkin had not pleaded a deprivation of a federally secured right: the Fifth Circuit does not recognize a constitutional right to expunction, and an alleged violation of Texas’s expunction statute neither creates a private civil cause of action nor supplies a § 1983 claim.
The magistrate judge also concluded that reputational harm alone did not state a due-process claim and that Lampkin alleged only his individual incident, not an official policy, custom, or deficient training or supervision that could establish municipal liability under Monell. The recommendation would deny leave to amend as futile, dismiss the Bexar County defendants with prejudice, and dismiss unserved defendants CCMSI and Does 1–10 without prejudice because the service deadline had passed.
Key Takeaways
- A claimed failure to expunge or correct records after an acquittal does not itself establish a federal constitutional violation.
- A county department cannot be sued independently unless it has separate jural authority.
- A § 1983 claim against a county requires nonconclusory facts tying a constitutional violation to an official policy, custom, or qualifying failure to train or supervise.
Why It Matters
The opinion underscores the limits of using § 1983 to enforce state-law expunction obligations. Plaintiffs alleging continuing harm from criminal-record information must identify a federally protected right and, when suing a municipality, plead facts connecting the injury to municipal action rather than relying on a single alleged failure.
Because this filing is a report and recommendation, the proposed dismissal was subject to objections and review by the district judge.