Reported / Citable
Background
Wilmer Antonio Lainez Lainez, a Honduran national, entered the United States without inspection in 2013 and had lived in Riverdale, Maryland, with his family, including three U.S.-born children, for over a decade. On November 6, 2025, he was detained during a vehicle stop in Frederick, Maryland, and served a Notice to Appear. Though he requested custody redeterminations, he was never afforded a bond hearing on the merits. On February 25, 2026, an immigration judge ordered him removed, but Lainez Lainez filed a timely appeal, leaving the removal order non-final and his case pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
His detention stemmed from a significant policy shift. In July 2025, DHS and DOJ issued interim guidance interpreting the mandatory detention provision of INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, to apply to all noncitizens who have never been admitted to the United States — including those who entered without inspection years earlier. The BIA adopted this position in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and the Fifth Circuit upheld the statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Under that framework, Lainez Lainez was subject to mandatory detention with no avenue for a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
Lainez Lainez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting, among other claims, that his prolonged detention without any individualized hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The government moved to dismiss, arguing he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, was lawfully subject to mandatory detention, and that his detention did not raise a constitutional concern.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part and ordered Lainez Lainez released by June 17, 2026. The court held that although Buenrostro-Mendez settled the statutory question — that § 1225(b)(2) applies to long-present noncitizens who entered without inspection — it did not foreclose as-applied due process challenges to mandatory detention. Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and following its own prior reasoning in Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026), the court found that Petitioner’s thirteen-year residence in the United States created a substantial liberty interest requiring constitutionally adequate procedural protections before the government could continue to detain him.
The court rejected the government’s exhaustion defense, finding no statutory exhaustion requirement applicable to immigration detention challenges outside the final-order context and ruling that any prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as futile — the BIA’s own precedent holds that immigration judges lack jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)(2), making any administrative appeal on this issue a pointless exercise.
Rather than ordering a bond hearing — which the court determined would be ineffective given the BIA’s jurisdictional position and the Fifth Circuit’s holding that § 1226(a) does not apply to applicants for admission — the court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release as the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation. The court further ordered that if Petitioner is re-detained, he must be afforded due process consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez that § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention applies to long-present undocumented noncitizens does not extinguish as-applied Fifth Amendment due process challenges to that detention.
- A noncitizen’s multi-year residence in the United States creates a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger Mathews v. Eldridge balancing, and detention without any individualized hearing can violate procedural due process even under a mandatory detention statute.
- Where the BIA’s own precedent forecloses jurisdiction for bond hearings, administrative exhaustion of that remedy is futile and need not be pursued before filing a § 2241 habeas petition.
- When a bond hearing would itself be an inadequate or unavailable remedy, a district court may order outright release as the appropriate equitable remedy for an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
Why It Matters
This decision is one of a growing line of district court rulings holding that the government’s expansive application of mandatory detention to noncitizens with long-established U.S. ties — a policy solidified by the BIA in Yajure Hurtado and upheld as a statutory matter by the Fifth Circuit — nonetheless runs into a constitutional floor under the Due Process Clause. Even where Congress has authorized mandatory detention and an appellate court has blessed the statute’s reach, an individualized liberty interest can still demand individualized process before the government may continue to hold someone.
For immigration practitioners, the ruling underscores both a litigation path and its limits: habeas under § 2241 remains available for due process challenges to detention even in mandatory-detention postures, exhaustion need not be pursued where the BIA has stripped immigration judges of jurisdiction to grant relief, and courts may order release rather than a futile bond hearing when the administrative machinery cannot provide an adequate remedy. The court’s explicit preservation of due process protections against any future re-detention adds an additional layer of protection for the petitioner going forward.