Reported / Citable
Background
Alexandro Kriman sued his former employers, Office Depot LLC and Veyer LLC, asserting numerous employment-related claims. His 202-page complaint alleged, among other things, that the defendants discriminated against him because of his accent, age, and an unspecified health condition and constructively terminated him. He also asserted retaliation-related theories, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and a claim concerning unpaid paid time off.
Kriman alleged that company personnel commented on his accent and that, after his employment ended, the defendants advertised his former position as an upgraded managerial role requiring “English Skills.” He also alleged that younger, less-qualified employees received advancement opportunities and that the defendants later reported an incorrect, shortened period of employment to a prospective employer. The defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss part of the complaint, and Kriman filed several requests to amend or supplement his pleading.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. It allowed Kriman’s Title VII and Texas Labor Code race or national-origin discrimination claims based on his accent to proceed. His allegations about accent-related comments, the new English-skills requirement, and the upgraded replacement position supplied enough circumstantial detail at the pleading stage to support an inference that his alleged constructive termination was connected to a protected characteristic.
The court dismissed the disability- and age-discrimination components of Kriman’s discrimination count without prejudice. Kriman did not allege facts showing a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and his generalized comparison to younger employees did not identify sufficiently comparable workers or circumstances. The court dismissed with prejudice his separately labeled claims for failure to stop retaliation, common-law constructive termination, termination during an EEOC investigation, unpaid paid time off, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Several were not independent causes of action, while the emotional-distress theory duplicated conduct covered by Texas’s statutory employment-discrimination scheme.
The court also denied Kriman’s motions for leave to amend or supplement his complaint. The ruling did not resolve the merits of the claims that survived the partial motion to dismiss.
Key Takeaways
- Accent-related comments, combined with a replacement posting requiring English skills, plausibly supported race or national-origin discrimination at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
- A health condition alone does not establish an ADA disability, and generalized references to younger employees do not adequately plead age discrimination.
- Constructive discharge and termination following an EEOC charge may support discrimination or retaliation claims, but they are not standalone causes of action.
- Texas’s statutory employment-discrimination remedy precludes an intentional-infliction claim based on the same alleged workplace retaliation.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that an employment-discrimination plaintiff need not plead a full prima facie case to survive dismissal, but must allege concrete facts connecting an adverse employment action to protected status. Comments about an employee’s accent and a subsequent English-language job requirement can provide that connection when considered together.
It also shows the risks of dividing employment allegations into numerous overlapping causes of action. Courts may treat constructive discharge and post-charge termination as facts supporting recognized discrimination or retaliation claims while dismissing duplicative or nonexistent standalone theories.