Reported / Citable
Background
Yesenia Carmen Gonzales Huerta, a Nicaraguan citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 2022 and was shortly thereafter apprehended by immigration authorities. She was released on an Order of Recognizance and spent nearly three years living in the United States without incident and with no apparent criminal history. On June 5, 2025, she was re-detained at a routine ICE check-in appointment without advance warning. She was not alleged to have violated any conditions of her prior release.
Following her re-detention, Huerta was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge, but she appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), leaving her removal order non-final. Throughout her detention she received no bond hearing. She filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing her prolonged detention without any individualized determination violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, among other claims.
The government moved for summary judgment, relying on the Fifth Circuit’s February 2026 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which held that the mandatory detention provision of INA § 235(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), applies to all applicants for admission regardless of how or when they entered. The government argued that under Buenrostro-Mendez, Huerta was subject to mandatory detention and her detention raised no due process concerns.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part and denied the government’s motion for summary judgment. Incorporating the legal framework from its prior decision in Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026), the court held that Buenrostro-Mendez resolved only the statutory question of who falls within § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme — it did not foreclose as-applied procedural due process challenges by noncitizens subject to that scheme. The court applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and found Huerta’s due process rights violated.
The court found that Huerta’s four-year residence in the United States and her nearly three years of prior release from custody created a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest requiring individualized justification before civil detention. Her sudden re-arrest at a routine check-in, without explanation or any advance notice, reinforced the weight of that interest. Citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), the court held that an expectation of freedom from detention — created by her years-long release on recognizance — can itself be a protected liberty interest.
Rather than ordering a bond hearing, the court ordered Huerta’s immediate release. It explained that the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses bond hearings under § 1226(a) for applicants for admission, and the BIA has similarly concluded it lacks jurisdiction to hold such hearings. Because a bond hearing would likely not occur even if ordered, and because a belated hearing cannot retroactively cure an unjustified deprivation of liberty, the court determined that release was the appropriate remedy.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling that § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of all applicants for admission does not eliminate as-applied Fifth Amendment due process challenges to prolonged detention without a bond hearing.
- A noncitizen’s multi-year residence in the United States and prior release from immigration custody can together constitute a protected liberty interest requiring individualized process before re-detention.
- Where the BIA and the Fifth Circuit have foreclosed bond hearings for § 1225(b)(2) detainees, ordering a bond hearing is an inadequate remedy — release is the appropriate remedy for the due process violation.
- The court ordered that if Huerta is re-detained, she must be afforded procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of district court rulings pushing back on the government’s broad application of mandatory detention to long-term U.S. residents re-detained at routine ICE check-ins. While Buenrostro-Mendez settled the statutory question in the Fifth Circuit, district courts in the Southern District of Texas continue to hold that due process imposes independent constraints on civil immigration detention — constraints that mandatory-detention statutes alone cannot extinguish.
The court’s decision to order outright release, rather than a bond hearing, reflects a practical reality created by the current legal landscape: the BIA has taken the position that it lacks jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for this class of detainees, making a hearing-based remedy hollow. Attorneys representing similarly situated clients — long-term U.S. residents detained without a bond hearing under § 1225(b)(2) — should note this court’s receptivity to as-applied due process habeas claims and its willingness to order release as the remedy.