Reported / Citable
Background
Enrique Gonzalez Villa, a Venezuelan national, entered the United States without inspection in September 2022 and was shortly thereafter apprehended and released on parole. He had no criminal history, held a valid work authorization, and resided in the United States without incident for over three years. On January 22, 2026, immigration officers re-detained him at a gas station in Oswego, New York, without presenting an arrest warrant or providing any explanation for the arrest.
The government asserted that Gonzalez Villa was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as an “applicant for admission” — a legal position adopted by DHS and DOJ in July 2025 interim guidance and affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Fifth Circuit upheld that statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Gonzalez Villa was never provided a bond hearing. He filed a pro se § 2241 habeas petition seeking immediate release, which the court liberally construed to raise a procedural due process challenge to his continued detention without individualized review.
The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that Buenrostro-Mendez resolved the detention question and that no due process violation occurred. The court denied that motion and granted the habeas petition in part.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen held that while the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez settled the statutory question — that § 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission regardless of whether they are actively seeking admission — that ruling did not foreclose as-applied due process challenges. Applying the balancing framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found that Gonzalez Villa’s three-plus years of residence in the United States and his prior release from custody together created a substantial liberty interest requiring constitutionally adequate procedures — including an individualized determination of whether continued detention was warranted — before that liberty could be taken away.
The court further reasoned that Gonzalez Villa’s 2022 parole release generated a legitimate expectation of freedom from detention during his removal proceedings, an interest recognized under Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Because he was re-detained without any bond hearing and the government did not allege any violation of his parole conditions, the deprivation of liberty was constitutionally infirm. The court declined to order a bond hearing as the remedy — finding that such a hearing would be futile because the BIA’s position is that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for individuals detained under § 1225(b)(2) — and instead ordered his immediate release from custody.
Respondents were ordered to release Gonzalez Villa by June 12, 2026, at 5:00 p.m., in a public place during daytime hours, return all identification documents seized during his detention, and provide him a printed copy of the order at the time of release. The court also ordered that if he is re-detained, he must be afforded Fifth Amendment procedural due process.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez that § 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission does not bar as-applied Fifth Amendment due process challenges to mandatory immigration detention.
- Long-term U.S. residence combined with a prior government-authorized release creates a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest that requires individualized justification — including a bond hearing or equivalent process — before re-detention.
- Where the BIA’s own jurisdictional position makes a bond hearing futile, a district court exercising habeas jurisdiction may order immediate release rather than remand for a hearing that is unlikely to occur.
- Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) retain Fifth Amendment due process rights, and their detention without individualized review may be remedied through § 2241 habeas corpus.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of district court rulings that have pushed back on the government’s expansive application of mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) to noncitizens who entered without inspection, were paroled, and lived lawfully in the United States for years before being re-detained. While Buenrostro-Mendez closed the door on statutory challenges in the Fifth Circuit, this case illustrates that constitutional due process claims remain viable — and that courts will scrutinize the government’s failure to provide individualized bond determinations even where mandatory detention is otherwise authorized.
The court’s choice of remedy — immediate release rather than a bond hearing — is particularly significant. By finding that an Immigration Judge would likely refuse to hold a hearing given the BIA’s jurisdictional stance, the court effectively identified a structural gap in which detainees are caught between a mandatory detention statute and an adjudicative body that will not review their cases. Attorneys representing noncitizens in similar postures — long-term U.S. residents, prior parole, no criminal history, re-detained under § 1225(b)(2) — should consider as-applied due process habeas challenges in federal district court as a practical avenue for relief.