Reported / Citable
Background
The case arose from a major explosion and fire at an ExxonMobil refinery in Baytown, Texas, in December 2021. An employee, who was not on the emergency response team, twice volunteered to enter the burning unit with firefighters to help close valves and stop the fuel flow. Following this traumatic experience, the employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by his primary care physician and two licensed clinical social workers.
Exxon was notified of these diagnoses. However, after obtaining its own conflicting evaluation from a different doctor, Exxon chose not to record the employee’s PTSD on OSHA-required logs (Form 300 and Form 301). At the time, an OSHA regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix), specifically required employers to record work-related mental illnesses if diagnosed by a qualified healthcare professional.
OSHA cited Exxon for an “other-than-serious” violation for failing to record the PTSD diagnosis and assessed a small monetary penalty. Exxon challenged the citation. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld OSHA’s action, and the ALJ’s decision became a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). Exxon then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing that OSHA lacked the statutory authority to create the mental-illness recording rule in the first place.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit granted Exxon’s petition, vacated OSHA’s mental-illness recording rule, and set aside the citation and penalty against Exxon. The court held that OSHA exceeded its statutory authority when it promulgated the rule requiring employers to record employees’ work-related mental illnesses.
The court’s decision turned on the interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act). Specifically, it analyzed the phrase “work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses” in 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2), the provision granting OSHA authority to issue recordkeeping regulations. The Act does not define “illnesses.” Applying the analytical framework from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, the court sought the “best reading” of the statute rather than simply deferring to the agency’s interpretation.
The court concluded that the best reading of “illnesses” in the context of the statute refers only to physical ailments, not mental ones. It reasoned that the associated words in the statute—such as the carveout for “minor injuries requiring only first aid” and conditions not involving “loss of consciousness, restriction of work or motion, or transfer to another job”—all point toward physical conditions. The court also examined dictionary definitions contemporaneous with the Act’s 1970 passage and found they supported a physical-only meaning. It dismissed OSHA’s reliance on legislative history and the Act’s broad statement of purpose as insufficient to overcome the specific statutory text.
Key Takeaways
- OSHA’s regulation requiring employers to record work-related mental illnesses, 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix), has been struck down as invalid by the Fifth Circuit.
- The term “illnesses” in the OSH Act’s recordkeeping provision (29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2)) refers exclusively to physical conditions, not mental health conditions like PTSD.
- This case demonstrates the application of the post-Chevron standard from Loper Bright, where a court independently determines the “best” statutory interpretation rather than deferring to a “permissible” agency reading.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly curtails OSHA’s authority in the realm of workplace mental health. For employers within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction (Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi), this ruling eliminates the federal mandate to log employee mental health conditions, even if they are directly attributable to a workplace event. It creates a split from jurisdictions that may still enforce the rule, potentially leading to further litigation and a request for Supreme Court review.
More broadly, the case is a prominent example of a federal appeals court applying the Supreme Court’s new framework in Loper Bright v. Raimondo to rein in a federal agency. By rejecting deference and independently analyzing the statutory text to find its “best” meaning, the court adopted a narrower view of the agency’s power than the agency itself claimed. This approach signals a continuing trend of judicial skepticism toward broad agency claims of authority, with significant implications for the scope of federal regulation across many industries.