Reported / Citable
Background
Ronaldo Cruz Escalona-Araque, a Venezuelan national, entered the United States without inspection in 2022, was briefly apprehended by immigration officials, and was released on an Order of Recognizance. He remained in the United States for over three years with no reported criminal history and continued attending routine ICE check-in appointments. On February 10, 2026, at one such appointment in Houston, he was re-detained and placed in federal immigration custody.
Escalona-Araque requested a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, but the IJ declined to hold one, ruling that he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). That provision had been reinterpreted by a July 2025 DHS/DOJ interim guidance — subsequently adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) — to apply to all noncitizens who had not been formally admitted, including those who entered without inspection and had long resided in the country. While his habeas petition was pending, an IJ ordered him removed, but Escalona-Araque appealed to the BIA, leaving the removal order non-final.
Escalona-Araque filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Texas, raising Fifth Amendment due process claims, an unlawful retroactivity argument, and a Mathews v. Eldridge balancing claim. He sought immediate release. The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s February 2026 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), compelled mandatory detention and foreclosed any due process challenge.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part and denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ordering Escalona-Araque released from custody by 5:00 p.m. on June 9, 2026. The court held that Buenrostro-Mendez, while confirming the applicability of § 1225(b)(2) to individuals like Petitioner, did not foreclose as-applied procedural due process challenges to prolonged civil detention without an individualized bond determination. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test — consistent with its prior ruling in Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026) — the court found that Petitioner’s liberty interests outweighed the government’s interest in detention without process.
The court identified two reinforcing bases for Petitioner’s liberty interest. First, his four-year residence in the United States since 2022 created a cognizable liberty interest requiring constitutionally adequate procedures, including an individualized detention determination. Second, his prior release on an Order of Recognizance — and the over three years he spent outside custody without any alleged violation of release conditions — created a reasonable expectation of freedom from detention during removal proceedings, further strengthening that liberty interest under Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
Rather than ordering a bond hearing, the court exercised its equitable habeas discretion to order outright release. It reasoned that a belated bond hearing would not cure the already-completed deprivation of liberty, that § 1226(a) — the provision authorizing bond hearings — does not apply to applicants for admission under Buenrostro-Mendez, and that the BIA’s position in Yajure Hurtado made it unlikely any IJ would actually conduct a bond hearing if ordered. The court further required that Petitioner be released in a public place during daytime hours, with all identification documents returned, and provided a copy of the order at the time of release.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez that § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention applies to all unadmitted noncitizens does not extinguish as-applied Fifth Amendment due process challenges to indefinite detention without a bond hearing.
- Long-term U.S. residence and a prior government-ordered release — without any violation of release conditions — together create a liberty interest substantial enough to require individualized procedural protections before re-detention under § 1225(b)(2).
- Where ordering a bond hearing would be futile because immigration courts lack jurisdiction to conduct one under current BIA precedent, a district court may order immediate release as the appropriate habeas remedy for the due process violation.
- Upon release, the government must return all identity documents taken from the detainee and provide a copy of the release order.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of district court rulings — particularly within the Southern District of Texas — holding that the government’s expansive post-2025 mandatory detention policy, while upheld as a statutory matter by the Fifth Circuit, cannot be applied to long-term residents and prior releasees without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. By granting immediate release rather than a bond hearing, the court confronted the practical reality that the BIA’s jurisdictional position renders a hearing-based remedy illusory, effectively forcing the due process remedy to be release itself.
For immigration practitioners, the case reinforces that noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)(2) — particularly those with substantial periods of U.S. residence and a prior release — have viable procedural due process claims even within the Fifth Circuit. It also signals that district courts in the Laredo Division are willing to order outright release, not merely a bond hearing, when the immigration court system is structurally unable to provide the process constitutionally due.