Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Virginia L. Dierlam, as trustee, and McFaddin Ranch L.P. own a 1,604-acre tract in Victoria County. Allegiant Resources operates the shut-in Remora Oil Unit No. 1 on adjoining land and sought to cross the Dierlam Ranch to plug the well. Dierlam had obtained a 2004 permanent injunction barring prior well operators from using the ranch to access the well, although Allegiant’s predecessors later paid for agreed access through 2015.
After the parties failed to agree on financial terms for renewed access, Dierlam sued to enforce the prior injunction and sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief. Allegiant counterclaimed and also requested a temporary injunction, maintaining that Texas Natural Resources Code § 89.044 authorized access to plug the well. Evidence indicated that alternative routes still required entry onto the ranch and that leaving the well unplugged posed pollution risks, particularly because it was near the San Antonio River. The trial court denied both sides’ temporary-injunction applications but concluded that § 89.044 authorized Allegiant to enter the ranch for plugging purposes.
The Court’s Holding
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Dierlam’s temporary-injunction application. It held that § 89.044(a), which permits specified persons including an operator to “enter the land of another” to plug or replug an improperly plugged well, is not limited to entry onto the land containing the well or to land owned by the well-site surface owner. The Legislature used the broader phrase “land of another” in the entry provision while expressly referring to an “owner of the surface estate” elsewhere in the statutory scheme.
Because the statutory text permitted entry onto Dierlam’s property for well-plugging purposes, Dierlam did not establish a probable right to the requested injunctive relief. The court therefore did not reach whether Dierlam had shown a probable, imminent, and irreparable interim injury. It also rejected Dierlam’s contention that the trial court had implicitly granted Allegiant an injunction, explaining that the order expressly denied Allegiant’s application and all other temporary relief not expressly granted.
Key Takeaways
- Texas Natural Resources Code § 89.044(a) authorizes an operator to enter the land of another when necessary to plug or replug an improperly plugged well.
- The statutory right of entry is not confined to the surface estate on which the well itself is located.
- A trial court does not implicitly grant one party temporary injunctive relief when its order expressly denies that party’s application, even if the order recognizes a statutory right of access.
Why It Matters
The decision gives “land of another” in § 89.044 its broad, ordinary meaning and confirms that well-plugging access may extend across neighboring property. That interpretation prevents surrounding landowners from categorically blocking access needed to satisfy plugging obligations and advance the statute’s pollution-prevention purpose.
The ruling arose from temporary-injunction proceedings, however, and addressed whether Dierlam demonstrated a probable right to interim relief rather than finally resolving every claim in the underlying litigation.