Reported / Citable
Background
Jhony Eduardo Cuadra Palma, a Nicaraguan citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 2022 and was shortly thereafter released into the country under the government’s discretionary parole authority. Over the following years he married a U.S. citizen, accrued no criminal history, complied with all conditions of his release, and had a family-based immigration petition pending. On March 23, 2026, he was re-detained at a routine ICE check-in and held in federal immigration custody in Texas without ever receiving a bond hearing. A removal order was subsequently entered against him, but he filed a timely appeal, leaving that order non-final.
His detention arose against the backdrop of a significant policy shift. In July 2025, DHS and DOJ issued interim guidance interpreting the mandatory detention provision of INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, to cover all noncitizens who had not been formally admitted — including those who entered without inspection and were later paroled — treating them as “applicants for admission” subject to detention without bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted this position in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In February 2026 the Fifth Circuit upheld that statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), though it did not address whether such detention satisfies due process.
Cuadra Palma filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing his prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and related doctrines. The government moved for summary judgment, contending mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is lawful and constitutionally sound.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part and denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ordering Cuadra Palma released from custody by June 24, 2026. Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found that while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses a statutory challenge to § 1225(b)(2)’s applicability, it does not bar an as-applied procedural due process challenge. Cuadra Palma’s four-year U.S. residency, prior release into the community, and the government’s failure to identify any violation of release conditions together created a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to require individualized justification for civil detention — an interest the government never provided.
The court relied heavily on its own prior ruling in Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026), and found the same reasoning controlling here. It further held that the appropriate remedy was immediate release rather than a bond hearing, for three reasons: the Fifth Circuit has held § 1226(a) (the bond-hearing provision) does not apply to applicants for admission; a retroactive hearing would not cure the deprivation of liberty already suffered; and the BIA’s own position is that immigration judges lack jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)(2), making any ordered hearing a futile exercise.
The court denied all other requested relief, including attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and ordered that if Cuadra Palma is re-detained in the future he must be afforded the procedural due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez that § 1225(b)(2) applies to all unadmitted noncitizens does not eliminate as-applied due process challenges; detainees may still argue their specific circumstances require an individualized bond determination.
- A noncitizen’s years of U.S. residency and prior release under government supervision — with no alleged violations — create liberty interests strong enough to demand procedural protections before civil detention, even under a mandatory-detention statute.
- Where the BIA has declared immigration courts lack jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for § 1225(b)(2) detainees, district courts may order outright release rather than a bond hearing as the remedy for a due process violation, because an ordered hearing would be illusory.
- The court expressly preserved due process requirements for any future re-detention of the petitioner, signaling ongoing judicial oversight of the government’s mandatory-detention policy.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of district court rulings — including several from the same judge — pushing back on the government’s expansive application of mandatory immigration detention to noncitizens who have lived in the United States for years under conditions of release. By holding that Buenrostro-Mendez settled only the statutory question and left the constitutional one open, the court has kept alive a significant avenue of relief for a broad class of detainees swept up under the post-2025 detention policy.
The ruling also highlights the practical bind the government has created for itself: by successfully arguing before the BIA that immigration judges have no jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for § 1225(b)(2) detainees, it has removed the safety valve that might otherwise satisfy due process — leaving federal district courts with little choice but to order release when a constitutional violation is found. Attorneys representing similarly situated clients facing mandatory detention without bond proceedings should take note of both the liberty-interest analysis and the remedial reasoning employed here.