Reported / Citable
Background
In April 2021, New Orleans Police Officer Derrick Burmaster responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the Browns’ home. Upon hearing a dog bark, Burmaster drew his firearm despite his partner’s signal to leave. When two dogs emerged from the house, one of them—Apollo, a 16-week-old puppy—approached Burmaster. The puppy did not bark, growl, jump, bite, or lunge. Burmaster fired three shots, killing Apollo in his owners’ arms.
The Browns sued Burmaster and the City of New Orleans, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation and state-law claims. After the district court denied Burmaster’s summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds, the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a special verdict finding that Burmaster violated the Browns’ Fourth Amendment rights but was nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.
As to municipal liability, the jury answered “Yes” to whether the City was liable for inadequate training, supervision, or discipline of Burmaster regarding use of force on dogs. However, the same jury answered “No” to whether the City’s policies actually caused Apollo’s death—creating a logical contradiction. The Browns appealed both verdicts.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the qualified immunity verdict but reversed the municipal liability verdict. The court held that qualified immunity properly went to the jury because factual disputes existed and the district court correctly instructed the jury on the clearly established law—the judge identifies the legal rule, and the jury applies that rule to disputed facts. The court rejected the Browns’ arguments that recent precedent (Ramirez v. Killian) prohibited jury consideration of immunity and that a proposed pretrial order barred the submission.
However, the court found the City’s liability verdict irreconcilable with the jury’s finding that no City policy caused Apollo’s death. Municipal liability requires both municipal culpability and causation. The jury cannot find that the City was liable while simultaneously finding that its policies did not cause the constitutional violation. The verdict form and jury instructions, read together, left no room for this contradictory interpretation. The court therefore reversed the City verdict and remanded for a new trial on municipal liability.
Key Takeaways
- Qualified immunity may properly be submitted to a jury when factual disputes exist, with the judge defining clearly established law and the jury applying that law to the facts it finds.
- Ramirez v. Killian does not prohibit jury consideration of the fact-bound application of immunity, only the purely legal determination of what law was clearly established.
- Municipal liability verdicts containing contradictory findings—liability without causation—must be reversed and remanded for retrial; inconsistent special verdicts cannot stand.
- A district court has broad discretion under Rule 39(b) to relieve parties from jury trial waivers, and that discretion extends to qualified immunity even when parties propose to exclude it.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the division of labor between judges and juries in qualified immunity cases, reinforcing that jury trials remain appropriate when material factual disputes exist. More significantly, it establishes that municipal liability cases cannot proceed with contradictory factual findings. Cities cannot be held liable for constitutional violations when the same jury that found them liable has also determined that no causal policy link exists—a principle with broad implications for Monell liability across the federal judiciary.
The decision also addresses a practical ambiguity in pretrial orders and jury trial waivers, establishing that district courts retain discretion to submit issues to juries despite party proposals to exclude them, particularly where fairness and the logical coherence of verdicts are at stake.