Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Steven and Rayma Benedict sought conservatorship of their granddaughter, Sadie, whose parents—Tonya Hill (Rayma’s biological daughter) and Charles Edward Hill Jr. (the child’s father)—were appointed joint managing conservators following their 2020 divorce. The Benedicts alleged that Tonya and Charles had engaged in family violence and that Tonya had a history of child neglect. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, finding that the Benedicts had not established the statutory requirements under Texas Family Code Section 102.003(a)(9).
The Benedicts appealed, asserting that Rayma had standing as a person who exercised actual care, control, and possession of Sadie for at least six months preceding the suit, and that Steven had similar standing as a stepfather. The central issues were whether the Benedicts’ periods of possession met the statutory requirements and whether the trial court properly dismissed based on procedural grounds.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that Rayma Benedict has standing to seek conservatorship under Section 102.003(a)(9) of the Family Code. The evidence established that Rayma shared a principal residence with Sadie for approximately six months in the aggregate—about four months in 2020 when Tonya was hospitalized for a seizure and undergoing rehabilitation, and over two months from November 2021 through January 2022 when the Benedicts filed suit. Critically, the court held that the six-month period need not be continuous; the statute’s language explicitly permits courts to add separate periods of possession together to meet the requirement.
Beyond mere residence, Rayma demonstrated actual care, control, and possession by providing for Sadie’s daily physical and psychological needs, exercising guidance and direction comparable to that of parents, and making substantial financial and emotional investments in the child’s welfare—including homeschooling her, ensuring her nutrition and clothing, making healthcare decisions, and covering most of her expenses. The court rejected the trial court’s finding that such evidence was insufficient and clarified that nonparents need not have exclusive control over a child to establish standing under Section 102.003(a)(9). The court also reversed the dismissal based on the Benedicts’ failure to file an affidavit under Section 153.432, holding that statute applies only to cases seeking possession or access, not to conservatorship cases. Steven Benedict’s claims were affirmed as dismissed, however, because insufficient evidence established his individual role in Sadie’s care.
Key Takeaways
- Grandparents can establish standing to seek conservatorship by demonstrating six months of actual care, control, and possession that need not be continuous or uninterrupted.
- The requisite six-month period can be computed by aggregating separate periods of possession separated by substantial time gaps; there is no requirement that possession immediately precede the filing of suit.
- Establishing “actual care, control, and possession” requires showing that the nonparent served in a parent-like role by sharing a residence, providing for daily physical and psychological needs, and exercising day-to-day guidance similar to parents—but does not require exclusive control.
- Section 153.432’s affidavit requirement applies to grandparent suits for possession or access, not to suits for conservatorship; failure to file such an affidavit in a conservatorship case does not warrant dismissal.
- Evidence of financial contributions, involvement in the child’s education and healthcare, and participation in the child’s general upbringing supports a finding of standing under Section 102.003(a)(9).
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the pathway for Texas grandparents to challenge existing custody arrangements by establishing standing under the “actual care and control” provision of the Family Code. By holding that the six-month requirement need not be continuous and that aggregation of separate periods is permissible, the court broadens the potential class of grandparents who may seek judicial relief when circumstances—such as parental hospitalization or incapacity—have temporarily placed children in their care. The decision also rejects a strict “exclusive control” standard, recognizing that grandparents often share caregiving responsibilities with parents and that shared duties do not defeat standing.
The opinion also corrects a procedural error by distinguishing between grandparent possession/access statutes and conservatorship provisions, preventing trial courts from applying possession-based requirements to conservatorship suits. Although the Texas Legislature subsequently amended Section 102.003(a)(9) effective September 1, 2025, to require “exclusive” rather than “actual” control, that amendment does not apply to cases filed before the effective date. This decision thus establishes the law governing grandparent standing under the prior standard and provides a roadmap for cases in transition.