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Baez Jorge v. Tate — dismissed immigration-detention challenge as premature

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Mario Rafael Baez Jorge v. Randy Tate, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Judge
Sim Lake
Date Decided
August 31, 2026
Docket No.
4:26-cv-05559
Topics
Immigration Detention, Habeas Corpus, Due Process, Temporary Restraining Orders

Background

Mario Rafael Baez Jorge, a Cuban citizen who entered the United States in 2013, was charged with removability in 2018. An immigration judge ordered him removed to Cuba on March 28, 2023, and he waived his right to appeal.

Immigration authorities took Baez Jorge into custody on May 24, 2026, after encountering him at the Harris County Sheriff’s Office. While ICE pursued removal to Mexico or another third country, he petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his detention violated due process under Zadvydas v. Davis. He also sought a temporary restraining order releasing him under supervision so that he could resume medical treatment and medication.

The Court’s Holding

The court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice as premature. Although Baez Jorge’s removal order became final in 2023, his detention under that order began in May 2026, approximately three months before the decision. Because he had not been detained beyond the six-month period considered presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas, he had not shown an actionable constitutional violation.

The court also denied the requested temporary restraining order because the requested release was the same ultimate relief sought through the habeas petition and could not be awarded preliminarily through a TRO. It granted Baez Jorge’s application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs.

Key Takeaways

  • The relevant detention had lasted approximately three months, less than the six-month presumptively reasonable period recognized under Zadvydas.
  • A detainee cannot obtain through a temporary restraining order the same release sought as the ultimate remedy in a habeas petition.
  • The dismissal was without prejudice, permitting a later petition if the six-month period expires without removal and the stated exhaustion and cooperation conditions are satisfied.

Why It Matters

The decision underscores that a post-removal-order detention challenge under Zadvydas is generally premature before six months of detention have elapsed. A final removal order entered years earlier does not itself establish detention beyond that period when the person was taken into immigration custody only recently.

The order also limits the use of emergency injunctive motions to secure immediate release when release is the ultimate relief requested in the habeas proceeding.

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