Reported / Citable
Background
Edgar Valdes Soria, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 2002 and lived here continuously for over 23 years. He has five U.S.-citizen children, no criminal history, and multiple pending avenues for relief from removal, including a Violence Against Women Act self-petition and an application for cancellation of removal. An immigration judge ordered him removed in November 2025, and his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was pending when ICE detained him on July 17, 2025.
By the time of the court’s ruling, Valdes Soria had been held for more than ten months under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), the broad “catch-all” mandatory detention provision applicable to noncitizens deemed not to have been lawfully admitted or paroled. He received no bond hearing and no individualized assessment of his danger to the community or flight risk. Through counsel, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing, among other claims, that his prolonged detention without any individualized hearing violated the Due Process Clause.
The government moved for summary judgment, contending that § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention and that danger and flight risk are statutorily irrelevant. It did not contest any of Valdes Soria’s factual representations. Following the Fifth Circuit’s February 2026 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)—which held that long-term interior residents not previously apprehended are subject to § 1225(b)(2)—the district court set aside the statutory question and turned exclusively to the constitutional one.
The Court’s Holding
Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. granted the habeas petition, holding that Valdes Soria’s detention under § 1225(b)(2), as applied to him, violated procedural due process. Applying the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found that all three factors weighed in the petitioner’s favor. First, Valdes Soria had a substantial protected liberty interest: a noncitizen who has lived in the United States for more than two decades and established deep family and community ties acquires constitutionally cognizable liberty interests in remaining free from physical detention. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation was high because the government provided no mechanism—no bond hearing, no notice, no opportunity to be heard—for an individualized assessment of whether detention was justified. Third, the government articulated no interest sufficient to override those constitutional protections; to the extent it relied on § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory language, the court reaffirmed that a statute cannot strip a person of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The court distinguished the government’s reliance on Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), which rejected a facial challenge to a different mandatory detention statute, § 1226(c), applicable to criminal aliens detained for an average of 47 days with access to a Joseph hearing. Here, by contrast, the court addressed an as-applied challenge involving a non-criminal detainee held for ten months under a broader catch-all provision with no procedural safeguards whatsoever. The court also distinguished Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), noting that its plenary-power rationale applies to challenges to immigration proceedings, not to challenges to the fact of physical detention itself.
As relief, the court ordered Valdes Soria released within 48 hours, with all identification documents returned to him. It further prohibited any re-detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings unless the government first obtains a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge and demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a flight risk or danger to the community.
Key Takeaways
- Detention under § 1225(b)(2) may be unconstitutional as applied to long-term interior residents who have acquired protected liberty interests, even if the Fifth Circuit holds the statute facially valid after Buenrostro-Mendez.
- The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test governs as-applied due process challenges to civil immigration detention; a court weighs the detainee’s liberty interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government’s countervailing interest—not just the statute’s plain text.
- Where the government provides no individualized hearing, no bond determination, and no notice or opportunity to be heard, the procedural due process violation is clear for a petitioner with substantial ties to the country and no criminal history.
- Any future re-detention of this petitioner requires a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge, with the government bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a rapidly growing body of district court rulings—within and beyond the Southern District of Texas—holding that prolonged mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) without individualized process is unconstitutional as applied to noncitizens with deep ties to the United States. The ruling illustrates how courts are carving out an as-applied due process pathway even after the Fifth Circuit’s Buenrostro-Mendez decision foreclosed the argument that § 1226 rather than § 1225(b) governs these detainees.
For practitioners, the opinion provides a detailed roadmap for as-applied habeas challenges: document the detainee’s length of residence, family ties, absence of criminal history, and pending relief applications; invoke Mathews rather than mounting a facial attack on the statute; and distinguish Demore and Thuraissigiam on their facts. The court’s order barring re-detention without a clear-and-convincing-evidence hearing also sets a meaningful procedural floor that goes beyond simple release.