Reported / Citable
Background
Karina Eugenia Rangel Pernia, a Venezuelan national, entered the United States in March 2024, was inspected and released by immigration officials, and applied for political asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. She lived in the community for over a year before ICE detained her in August 2025 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), the mandatory detention statute applicable to certain arriving aliens. ICE denied her request for a bond hearing. An immigration judge ordered her removed in November 2025, and her appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals remained pending at the time of this decision.
Proceeding pro se, Rangel Pernia filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that her detention without any individualized custody hearing violated the Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. She sought immediate release or, in the alternative, an individualized bond hearing. The government moved for summary judgment, contending that § 1225(b) mandated her detention and that her due process claims failed, but did not respond to her APA argument.
The court declined to reach the statutory question of whether § 1225(b) applied — noting the Fifth Circuit’s February 2026 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which held that long-present immigrants not previously apprehended could be subject to mandatory detention under that provision — and instead resolved the case solely on constitutional due process grounds.
The Court’s Holding
Applying the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. held that the petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2), as applied to her, violated procedural due process. On the first factor, the court found that Rangel Pernia had acquired a constitutionally protected liberty interest: she had lived in the United States for over a year, been released by immigration officials, and established community ties, with no criminal history or violated release conditions identified by the government. On the second factor, the court found a high risk of erroneous deprivation because she had received no notice, no opportunity to be heard, and no individualized determination regarding her detention — relief that could readily be provided through a bond hearing. On the third factor, the court found the government’s interest insufficient, noting that the respondents made no showing of danger to the community or flight risk and that a bond hearing would address any such concerns at minimal cost.
The court rejected the government’s reliance on Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), distinguishing that case as a facial challenge to a different statute (§ 1226(c)) covering criminal aliens who had received prior procedural protections, been detained for an average of only 47 days, and whose detention was demonstrably justified by evidence of criminal recidivism. It also distinguished Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), noting that the petitioner challenged only her detention — not her right to relief from removal — and that her as-applied due process claim did not implicate the sovereign prerogative over entry decisions on which Thuraissigiam rested.
Because all three Mathews factors weighed in the petitioner’s favor, the court granted the habeas petition and ordered the respondents to release Rangel Pernia within 48 hours, return her identification documents, and refrain from re-detaining her during removal proceedings unless a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge results in a clear-and-convincing-evidence finding of flight risk or danger to the community.
Key Takeaways
- An immigrant detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) who has lived in the United States for an extended period and established community connections acquires a constitutionally protected liberty interest, even if she entered without inspection or was initially released as an “arriving alien.”
- The government’s reliance on the mandatory language of § 1225(b)(2) does not end the constitutional inquiry: a statute cannot strip a person of procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and the government must provide notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an individualized determination to justify continued civil detention.
- As-applied due process challenges to § 1225(b)(2) detention — as distinct from facial challenges or challenges to removal proceedings — are not foreclosed by Demore v. Kim or Thuraissigiam, consistent with a broad and growing consensus among district and circuit courts.
- Where no adequate procedure exists for testing the legality of detention, the appropriate habeas remedy is immediate release, not a remand for a bond hearing; any future re-detention requires a pre-detention hearing with clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or dangerousness.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a substantial and accelerating wave of federal court rulings — spanning multiple circuits — holding that immigrants detained under § 1225(b)(2) without individualized hearings are entitled to due process protections, notwithstanding the statute’s mandatory detention language and recent Fifth Circuit precedent expanding that statute’s reach. For immigration practitioners, the case underscores that length of presence, community ties, and absence of criminal history are legally significant in as-applied constitutional challenges, and that the government’s failure to make any showing of dangerousness or flight risk is fatal under Mathews.
More broadly, the decision highlights the constitutional limits on indefinite civil immigration detention without procedural safeguards. The court’s order prohibiting re-detention absent a clear-and-convincing-evidence hearing effectively imports a substantive standard — borrowed from criminal pretrial detention law — into the immigration context. As removal proceedings grow lengthier and the government continues to assert broad mandatory detention authority, decisions like this one are likely to generate further appellate litigation over the scope of due process protections for long-resident noncitizens.