Reported / Citable
Background
Rosario Cruzata Rojas, who admitted to illegal entry into the United States, filed an amended habeas corpus petition challenging her detention under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)(A). Cruzata Rojas had previously been released on supervision and argued that she complied with all immigration orders before her detention, had no criminal history, posed no danger to the community, and had pending immigration proceedings under the Cuban Adjustment Act. She also contended that detention was causing her significant physical and emotional harm.
The District Court’s initial petition had been struck for lack of jurisdiction based on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which held that §1225(b)(2)(A) subjects anyone present in the United States without legal admission to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission.” Cruzata Rojas was given an opportunity to file an amended petition specifying individual circumstances or additional arguments. Her amended petition proceeded pro se and raised statutory, equitable estoppel, due process, and hardship-based challenges.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the amended petition and dismissed the action with prejudice. Judge Eskridge held that Cruzata Rojas was bound by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez, which establishes that individuals present in the United States without legal admission are subject to mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2)(A). The court noted that a district court is bound by circuit precedent unless overturned by en banc decision or Supreme Court reversal, and Cruzata Rojas’s disagreement with prior decisions is not a basis for habeas relief.
The court rejected Cruzata Rojas’s equitable estoppel argument—that prior administrative decisions to forgo enforcement should bind the current Administration. Citing Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the court held that courts are “exceedingly reluctant” to grant equitable estoppel against the government, particularly where the government needs to enforce clear statutory language and legitimate shifts in enforcement policy occur due to changes in administration. The court emphasized that allowing such estoppel would undermine the rule of law and improperly hinder the government’s ability to enforce statutes.
On due process claims, the court held that procedural and substantive due process does not require an individualized custody determination beyond the mandate of §1225(b)(2)(A), and that pre-removal-order detention does not violate substantive due process during pending deportation proceedings. The court noted that the vacated Fifth Circuit panel decision in Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega (which had required bond hearings after ninety days) was vacated on July 10, 2026, pending en banc rehearing and is “of no precedential value.” The court found that Cruzata Rojas’s individual circumstances—lack of criminal history, pending immigration proceedings, compliance with prior orders, and personal hardship—are relevant to whether she should ultimately be removed but do not affect the lawfulness of detention during removal proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- The government may detain individuals under §1225(b)(2)(A) during removal proceedings regardless of prior administrative decisions to forgo enforcement.
- Equitable estoppel rarely applies against the government in immigration enforcement matters, particularly when the statute’s plain language is clear.
- Due process does not mandate individualized custody determinations or bond hearings beyond what the statute requires during pending removal proceedings.
- Individual circumstances such as criminal history, compliance with prior orders, and hardship are relevant to removal decisions but not to the legality of detention.
- Conditions-of-confinement claims must be brought as civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983, not as habeas corpus petitions.
- The vacatur of Sosnava Rodriguez eliminates the temporary requirement for bond hearings after ninety days.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the government’s broad authority to enforce immigration detention statutes based on their plain text, unconstrained by prior administrative non-enforcement or shifts in enforcement policy. It significantly limits habeas corpus as a remedy for challenging immigration detention and narrows the scope of due process protection in removal proceedings. By holding that individual circumstances do not create constitutional protections beyond statutory minimums, the court adopts a highly restrictive approach to judicial review of immigration detention decisions.
The decision is also notable for its treatment of Sosnava Rodriguez, which had briefly created a requirement for bond hearings after ninety days. The vacatur of that decision restores complete statutory discretion to the government. Together with the binding precedent of Buenrostro-Mendez, this case reflects the Fifth Circuit’s and this District Court’s consistent curtailment of judicial review over immigration detention, particularly for individuals present without legal admission status.