Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Father appealed an order terminating his parental rights to his minor child, identified by the pseudonym “Kathleen.” The appeal came from the County Court at Law in Orange County, Texas, in Trial Cause No. 250308-D. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds supported termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (P), and that termination was in Kathleen’s best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights, but she was not a party to this appeal. The appellate court used pseudonyms for the child and parents under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.8(b)(2).
Father’s appointed attorney filed an Anders brief stating her professional conclusion that the record presented no meritorious issues for appeal. The brief evaluated the record and explained why no arguable grounds existed to overturn the judgment. Counsel represented that she had given Father a copy of the brief, notified him of his right to file a pro se brief, and provided him a copy of the appellate record. The court of appeals separately notified Father of his right to respond and of the filing deadline. Father did not file a response.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth District affirmed the termination order. It independently evaluated the appellate record and appointed counsel’s brief, as required when counsel concludes that an appeal is frivolous. The court relied on Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.), for the application of Anders procedures in parental-rights termination cases. It also cited Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), and In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.), in describing its independent review.
Based on that review, the court found nothing that would arguably support an appeal and agreed with counsel that the appeal was frivolous and lacked merit. It therefore found no need to appoint new counsel to re-brief the appeal, citing Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The court’s memorandum opinion did not separately reweigh the termination evidence or announce new substantive standards for the statutory predicates or best-interest finding; its stated basis for affirmance was the absence of any arguable ground for reversal after reviewing the record and counsel’s submission.
The court also addressed the possibility of further review. If Father chooses to seek review in the Supreme Court of Texas, his counsel’s obligation may be satisfied “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief,” citing In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016). The opinion was submitted on September 21, 2026, and delivered on November 5, 2026. Justice Kent Chambers signed the opinion, and the Before line identifies Johnson, Wright, and Chambers, JJ.
Key Takeaways
- The court affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights after independently reviewing the record and appointed counsel’s Anders brief.
- The trial court’s findings rested on clear and convincing evidence under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (P), together with the best-interest finding under subsection (b)(2).
- Father received the brief and appellate record, was informed of his opportunity to file a pro se response, and did not respond.
- The court found no arguable appellate issue, agreed that the appeal was frivolous, and declined to appoint new counsel for re-briefing.
Why It Matters
The opinion illustrates the Beaumont court’s application of Anders procedures in a parental-rights termination appeal. Counsel’s no-merit conclusion did not itself dispose of the appeal: the court independently examined the record before agreeing that no arguable basis for reversal existed. The opinion also confirms that new counsel need not be appointed merely to re-brief an appeal after that review, and it identifies the procedure counsel may use if Father pursues a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas.