Reported / Citable
Background
Erick Bladimir Torres Rivera, detained by the Department of Homeland Security at the Houston Contract Detention Facility, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He acknowledged entering the United States as a noncitizen and did not claim a lawful entry.
Rivera argued that his detention was unlawful because his arrest was illegal, detention violated due process, and the government relied on the wrong immigration statute. He also sought an order directing respondents to show cause.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Drew B. Tipton dismissed the petition with prejudice at screening. The court held that Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Rivera’s statutory argument: a noncitizen present in the United States without having been admitted is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The court further held that binding en banc Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Rivera’s due-process challenge to mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing. The court also rejected his arrest-based arguments, explaining that an allegedly unlawful arrest or agency violation would not entitle him to release from immigration custody. Rivera was not under a final removal order, so the court did not treat his case as one involving post-removal-order detention. His motion for an order to show cause was denied as moot.
Key Takeaways
- Noncitizens who have not been admitted to the United States are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
- Under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent, that detention does not require an individualized bond hearing merely because the government has not shown dangerousness or flight risk.
- An allegedly unlawful immigration arrest does not itself require release from detention or invalidate subsequent removal proceedings.
Why It Matters
The decision applies recent Fifth Circuit authority that sharply limits habeas challenges to pre-removal mandatory detention of noncitizens who were never admitted. It confirms that statutory and generalized due-process objections to detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) will fail in the Southern District of Texas when they are materially indistinguishable from those precedents.
The order also distinguishes pre-removal detention from the separate constitutional limits that may apply after a final removal order or where removal becomes only a remote possibility.