Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Claudia Ortiz was seriously injured in a July 2022 traffic accident. Her brother Francisco Martinez, acting as her next friend, signed a contingent-fee agreement with the Adler law firm on August 11, 2022. Five days later, while still in the intensive-care unit, Ortiz signed a virtually identical agreement. Both agreements stated that if the client released Adler before settlement, Adler retained the right to collect full contingency fees even if another attorney obtained recovery.
On August 21, 2022, Martinez terminated Adler’s representation. Different counsel filed suit and retained another firm. Adler intervened in December 2022, seeking judgment that both fee agreements were valid. In its prayer for relief, Adler asked for “judgment that it has valid contingent fee agreements with Claudia Ortiz and Francisco Martinez.”
In May 2025, Martinez moved for summary judgment—but only on Ortiz’s August 16 agreement, claiming she lacked mental capacity to contract at the time of signing. Martinez said nothing about his own August 11 agreement. On June 2, 2025, the trial court granted summary judgment, ordering Adler to “take nothing” and severing the intervention. The order disposed of both fee agreements despite addressing only one.
The Court’s Holding
The Texas Court of Appeals held that a summary judgment “may only be granted upon grounds expressly asserted in the summary-judgment motion.” A trial court commits reversible error when it grants relief on a claim not addressed in the motion. Here, Martinez explicitly moved only on Ortiz’s agreement based on lack of capacity. He made no motion regarding his own separate contract.
The court emphasized that appellate courts cannot “read between the lines, infer or glean” grounds for summary judgment beyond those expressly presented. The trial court’s order violated this principle by disposing of both contracts when only one was challenged. The court noted that Martinez’s summary-judgment “why” was “targeted, specific, and unequivocal”—limited to Ortiz’s incapacity—and nothing in the motion indicated he sought judgment on his own separate agreement.
Although Adler did not contest the summary judgment on Ortiz’s contract, the court reversed the judgment as to Martinez’s contract and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment on Ortiz’s contract but held that because the trial court exceeded the scope of the motion, reversal was required on the unaddressed claim.
Key Takeaways
- Summary judgments are confined to grounds expressly stated in the motion; courts cannot expand relief sua sponte to unaddressed claims
- Even when multiple related claims exist, a motion challenging only one does not authorize disposition of all
- A motion’s scope is determined by its own language, not what a party might implicitly seek or what the court might infer
- Procedural rules strictly limiting summary-judgment grounds protect parties’ right to be heard on all claims presented
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces fundamental procedural safeguards in summary-judgment practice. Trial courts cannot bootstrap relief beyond what a movant requests, even when disposing of an entire intervention or claim. The holding protects defendants and respondents from having unanticipated claims decided without opportunity to respond. Here, although the underlying fee-agreement dispute remains unresolved, the court ensured Adler would have a chance to litigate its claim under Martinez’s separate contract.
The case also illustrates how procedural compliance becomes critical in rapid litigation. Adler’s claim on Martinez’s contract—not addressed in the summary-judgment motion—survived reversal despite the trial court’s final order. For practitioners, the opinion underscores the necessity of precisely tailoring summary-judgment motions to the claims actually to be disposed of and the risk that trial courts will not expand relief beyond what is explicitly requested.