Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Houston Police Officer Christopher Cabrera was driving back to a police station to complete paperwork after responding to an earlier 9-1-1 call when his patrol car struck a vehicle driven by Charles Payne. Cabrera had reached speeds of up to 70 miles per hour on a road with a 35-mile-per-hour limit, briefly looked down at his laptop, and was not using his emergency lights or siren. Payne, who was making a left turn while experiencing a heart attack and elevated blood sugar and while under the influence of marijuana, died shortly after the collision.
Payne’s family sued the City of Houston under the Texas Tort Claims Act, among other claims. The Fifth Circuit had previously affirmed the denial of the City’s motion to dismiss. After further proceedings, the district court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, and the City filed this interlocutory appeal based on governmental immunity.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the family’s favor, the court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed over whether Cabrera breached statutory duties prohibiting unsafe speed and reckless driving and whether his speeding and inattention proximately caused the fatal collision. The family’s expert opined that the collision would not have occurred had Cabrera been traveling at the speed limit. Those disputes prevented summary judgment on whether the Act’s motor-vehicle waiver of governmental immunity applied.
The court also rejected the City’s two asserted statutory bars. An agreed dismissal with prejudice of Cabrera’s earlier state-court suit against Payne’s estate was not a “judgment against” Cabrera triggering the Act’s election-of-remedies provision. And the 9-1-1 exception did not apply because Cabrera was returning to the station to complete paperwork, not “responding” to a 9-1-1 emergency call when the collision occurred.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence that an officer drove as fast as twice the speed limit, looked at a laptop, and lacked activated lights or a siren created triable questions concerning breach and proximate cause.
- A settlement-based agreed dismissal of an employee’s claims is not a “judgment against” that employee under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(d).
- An officer returning to the station to complete paperwork after an emergency response is not necessarily still “responding to a 9-1-1 emergency call” under § 101.062(b).
Why It Matters
The decision allows Payne’s family to continue pursuing its state-law claim against Houston under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s motor-vehicle waiver. It also limits the City’s ability to characterize post-response administrative travel as part of a 9-1-1 response and confirms that factual disputes about an officer’s driving conduct and causation can preclude immunity-based summary judgment.