Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Alfonso Perez and Angela Perez were named joint managing conservators of their son, A.S.P., in a 2011 divorce decree, with Mother authorized to designate the child’s primary residence and Father ordered to pay child support. A 2020 order established Father’s ongoing support obligations and entered judgments for child-support and medical-support arrearages.
Father later sought modification after A.S.P. began living with him. At a March 2024 hearing, the parties agreed that Father would have primary custody, Mother would receive possession under the standard order for parents living more than 100 miles apart, and Mother would pay child support based on her 2023 earnings. The trial court orally rendered judgment, but the parties had not agreed on when Father’s support obligation would end or when Mother’s would begin.
The trial court subsequently signed Mother’s proposed final order, setting her monthly support at $99.63 but crossing out its stated commencement date and telling the parties to “figure it out.” Father appealed, arguing that the order both added provisions outside the agreement and omitted material terms.
The Court’s Holding
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the start and end dates of the parents’ respective child-support obligations were material terms. Because the parties did not consent to those terms on the record, the trial court could not leave them unresolved while treating its order as an agreed judgment. The appellate court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine when Father’s payments end and Mother’s payments begin.
The court rejected Father’s challenge to twenty-three other provisions concerning matters such as withholding, payment procedures, medical and dental support, insurance, notices, and tax treatment. Father did not explain why those provisions were material to the parties’ bargain, and many were nondiscretionary provisions required by the Texas Family Code or clarifying terms needed to implement the agreement.
The court affirmed the order in all other respects. It also concluded that Father inadequately briefed his challenge to attorney’s fees and failed to preserve his complaint that the trial court improperly announced that it was rendering judgment at the March hearing.
Key Takeaways
- An agreed judgment must strictly comply with the parties’ agreement as to every material term.
- The dates on which child-support obligations begin and end are material terms that cannot be supplied through an asserted agreement when the parties never consented to them.
- A final order may include statutory or implementing provisions that were not expressly recited if they do not materially alter the parties’ bargain.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that courts and counsel should place every essential child-support term on the record, particularly the amount, commencement date, and termination date. An agreement on custody and the amount of support does not establish consent to the timing of the parties’ respective obligations.
At the same time, the ruling distinguishes material bargain terms from standard provisions needed to implement a custody and support order. A party challenging those additional provisions must explain why they materially depart from the agreement rather than merely observing that they were not expressly discussed.