Reported / Citable
Background
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to M.S. Under Texas Family Code section 161.001(f), a court may not terminate parental rights under subsection (b)(1) unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence—and describes with specificity in a separate section of its order—that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent.
The termination order stated that the Department created a narrowly tailored family service plan and made a referral for services, provided services, or paid for services. A space for identifying additional reunification efforts was left blank. The caseworker testified that she drafted a service plan, but the evidence did not show that the plan was filed, approved, or delivered to Mother, and the caseworker acknowledged that she never discussed it with her.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return M.S. to Mother and that rendition was required. Justice Doss joined the court’s opinion and wrote separately to address the statutory findings required of the trial court and the consequences of the findings actually entered.
Justice Doss reasoned that, even assuming the order’s form-language findings were sufficiently specific, the evidence did not support them. No evidence showed that the Department referred, provided, or paid for services, and a service plan that never reached Mother could not by itself establish reasonable reunification efforts. He also concluded that an appellate court could not imply additional efforts from the record because sections 161.001(f) and (g) require the trial court to identify those efforts expressly in the termination order.
Key Takeaways
- A termination order under section 161.001(b)(1) must specifically describe the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent.
- Drafting a service plan that was never filed, approved, delivered, or discussed with the parent did not establish reasonable reunification efforts.
- According to the concurrence, implied or presumed findings cannot supply reunification efforts that the statute required the trial court to state in its order.
Why It Matters
The concurrence underscores that the Family Code’s written-finding requirements are substantive safeguards, not mere formalities. Trial courts must identify the Department’s actual reunification efforts, and those findings must be supported by legally sufficient evidence.
For appellate practitioners, Justice Doss’s analysis limits reliance on implied findings in termination cases when the Legislature expressly requires specific written findings in the order itself.