Reported / Citable
Background
Jamaal Howard was convicted and sentenced to death for the 2000 murder of Vickie Swartout at a Texas gas station. During federal habeas proceedings, his legal team investigated whether he had an intellectual disability that would make him ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia. The team concluded in 2017 that he did not, and Howard abandoned his Atkins claim. The district court later denied his remaining claims, and the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
After Texas scheduled Howard’s execution for October 7, 2026, he revived his Atkins claim. He argued that updated clinical standards would now classify him as intellectually disabled and that those standards effectively supplied a new, retroactive, and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law. He asked the Fifth Circuit to authorize a second Section 2254 application and, alternatively, to stay his execution pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Guerrero v. Johnson.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit denied authorization because Howard’s proposed application was untimely. Atkins recognized the asserted constitutional right in 2002, and the court concluded that the updated clinical materials did not restart the limitations period based on a newly discoverable factual predicate. The only guidance issued within one year of Howard’s filing—the APA’s August 2026 guidelines—endorsed an assessment method already used by a doctor who evaluated Howard in 2017 rather than revealing a new factual basis for his claim.
The court also rejected equitable tolling, finding that Howard had not diligently pursued the claim and had identified no extraordinary circumstance preventing timely filing. It characterized his last-minute filing as laches and unclean hands. Independently, the court held that Section 2244(b)(1) barred the application because Howard had presented an Atkins claim in his first federal habeas petition, even though he later abandoned it and no court adjudicated it. Updated factual support did not transform that previously presented legal claim into a new one.
The court likewise denied a stay of execution. Howard lacked a likelihood of success because his application was both time-barred and based on a previously presented claim. The state’s and public’s interests in timely enforcement, along with the court’s equitable concerns about Howard’s delay, outweighed the irreparable injury he faced. The possibility of a favorable future Supreme Court ruling did not justify a stay.
Key Takeaways
- New clinical guidance does not restart AEDPA’s limitations period unless it supplies a newly discoverable factual predicate for the habeas claim.
- A claim may be “presented” under Section 2244(b)(1) even if the petitioner later abandons it and no court adjudicates it.
- Additional facts or updated diagnostic standards do not create a new claim when the petitioner invokes the same underlying constitutional rule.
- A pending Supreme Court case and the certainty of irreparable injury do not warrant a stay when the petitioner lacks likely merits success and the remaining equitable factors weigh against relief.
Why It Matters
The order underscores two independent barriers to successive capital habeas litigation: AEDPA’s one-year limitations period and its prohibition on claims previously presented. Petitioners cannot necessarily revive an abandoned constitutional claim by relying on later professional standards or newly assembled factual support.
The decision also shows that timing can affect both equitable tolling and a stay request. The Fifth Circuit treated Howard’s delay after the relevant clinical developments and execution scheduling as weighing against equitable relief, despite the irreversible consequence of execution.