Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A jury found grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to B.C. based on endangering conduct, constructive abandonment, and criminal conduct resulting in imprisonment and an inability to care for the child for two years after the termination petition was filed. The jury also found that the Department of Family and Protective Services made reasonable reunification efforts and that termination was in B.C.’s best interest.
Both parents were incarcerated when B.C. was born. Mother was serving a 12-year sentence after convictions involving methamphetamine and fentanyl, and Father was serving a 35-year sentence and had 11 felony convictions. B.C. was placed with members of Mother’s family who had adopted two of her half-brothers and wanted to adopt her. Shortly before trial, Father unsuccessfully sought both an extension of the statutory dismissal deadline and placement of B.C. with her paternal grandfather. Mother, Father, and Grandfather appealed the termination order.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed. It held that Mother’s new-trial motion preserved only her factual-sufficiency challenge to the jury’s best-interest finding. Her generalized objections did not preserve challenges to the specific statutory termination grounds or the reasonable-efforts finding, and she did not preserve a legal-sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding. On the preserved issue, the full record—including Mother’s longstanding drug use, fentanyl use during pregnancy, repeated incarcerations, prior terminations involving seven other children, and inability to provide B.C. a stable home—factually supported the jury’s best-interest finding. B.C.’s bond with her foster family and half-brothers, and the foster parents’ plan to adopt her, further supported termination.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to extend the dismissal deadline because Father’s possible parole was speculative and did not establish extraordinary circumstances justifying delay. Father lacked standing to challenge B.C.’s placement once termination of his rights was affirmed; alternatively, the trial court acted within its discretion by leaving B.C. in her stable, adoption-motivated placement rather than moving her to Grandfather shortly before trial. Because neither ruling was erroneous, Father’s cumulative-harm argument failed. Grandfather could not challenge the final order because his intervention had been struck and he did not appeal that ruling.
Key Takeaways
- A motion for new trial must identify the specific jury findings being challenged; a generalized attack on all termination findings does not preserve separate sufficiency issues.
- A parent’s speculative prospect of parole does not necessarily constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting an extension of a child-protection case’s dismissal deadline.
- A court may decline a late request for relative placement when moving the child would disrupt an established, stable, and adoption-motivated placement.
Why It Matters
The opinion underscores the strict application of error-preservation rules even in parental-rights cases. Counsel challenging a jury verdict must separately and clearly identify each statutory ground and best-interest or reasonable-efforts finding for which appellate review is sought.
It also confirms that relative-placement preferences do not override the child-centered inquiry into stability and permanence, particularly when the request comes late and the child is thriving in an existing placement.