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Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies — Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of parking-fee FDCPA claim on alternative grounds

Reported / Citable

Case
Todd Frankfort; Curtis Goodban v. Metropolis Technologies, Incorporated
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Judge
King; Smith; Ramirez
Date Decided
October 2, 2026
Docket No.
25-11168
Topics
FDCPA, Debt Collectors, Parking Fees, Pleading Standards
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Metropolis Technologies operates gateless parking facilities that use cameras to record vehicles’ entry and exit times. Drivers pay by scanning QR codes posted inside the facilities. When a driver leaves without paying, Metropolis mails a “Notice of Parking Violation” demanding the unpaid parking charge plus a larger violation fine.

Todd Frankfort and Curtis Goodban received such notices and brought a putative class action alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Texas law. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claim with prejudice, reasoning that Metropolis fell within the statutory exclusion for a person collecting a debt it originated, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The Court’s Holding

The Fifth Circuit held that the district court misinterpreted the FDCPA’s originator exclusion. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii), the exclusion applies only when a person both collects debts owed to another and originated those debts. The district court therefore could not apply the exclusion merely because Metropolis allegedly originated the parking debts, without first determining that it collected them for another party.

The court nevertheless affirmed dismissal because the complaint did not plausibly allege that Metropolis was a “debt collector.” Its factual allegations showed that Metropolis’s principal purpose was operating parking facilities, not collecting debts, and did not plausibly connect its partnerships with property owners to the collection of debts on their behalf.

The court also affirmed dismissal with prejudice. Although the district court’s futility analysis rested on its erroneous interpretation of the originator exclusion, the plaintiffs made only bare requests for leave to amend and did not identify the additional facts they would plead to cure the deficiencies.

Key Takeaways

  • The FDCPA’s originator exclusion applies only to a person who collects debts for another and also originated those debts.
  • Allegations that debt collection is part of a parking operator’s business do not establish that debt collection is the business’s principal purpose.
  • A bare request for leave to amend, without identifying proposed new facts or explaining how amendment would cure the pleading defects, may support dismissal with prejudice.

Why It Matters

The decision narrows the proper use of the FDCPA’s originator exclusion at the pleading stage: a defendant cannot invoke it solely by showing that it created the debt. The defendant must also satisfy the exclusion’s prerequisite that it was collecting a debt owed to another.

At the same time, the ruling underscores that plaintiffs must plead concrete facts establishing one of the FDCPA’s definitions of “debt collector.” Business partnerships and revenue-related services, without facts tying them to collection activity for another, are insufficient.

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