Reported / Citable
Background
Jesse Frank Diaz, proceeding without counsel, sued entities and individuals connected to the foreclosure and eviction from his property. He alleged that his mortgage loan had passed through undocumented or fraudulent transfers and that the entities pursuing foreclosure lacked legal standing. His complaint asserted constitutional, fraud, and statutory claims and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
VMC REO, LLC, which purchased the property at a June 2025 public auction, and Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing moved to dismiss. Diaz’s attached documents showed that a Texas justice court had issued a writ of possession before he filed the federal action. In opposing dismissal, Diaz addressed only the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, leaving his other claims unpursued.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney recommended granting VMC and Shellpoint’s motion to dismiss. She concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over claims seeking relief from injuries caused by the state-court writ of possession because those claims amounted to a collateral attack on the preexisting state judgment.
As an alternative basis for dismissal, the magistrate judge concluded that Diaz failed to state a Section 1983 claim. VMC and Shellpoint were private parties, and their use of state recording offices, constables, and judicial procedures did not plausibly establish that they acted under color of state law. The report also recommended dismissing the claims against the remaining defendants without prejudice under Rule 4(m) because Diaz’s certified-mail return receipts were not signed by the addressees and the service deadline had expired.
Key Takeaways
- The ruling is a report and recommendation to District Judge Fred Biery, not a final judgment adopting the proposed dismissals.
- Rooker-Feldman bars a federal district court from reviewing claims based on injuries caused by a state-court writ of possession issued before the federal suit began.
- Private mortgage and foreclosure entities do not become state actors merely by using state-authorized foreclosure, eviction, recording, or enforcement procedures.
- Certified-mail service was defective because the filed return receipts lacked the addressees’ signatures.
Why It Matters
The recommendation illustrates the jurisdictional obstacle facing borrowers who frame federal claims as challenges to completed state eviction proceedings. When the alleged injury flows from a state-court judgment, requesting damages instead of expressly seeking reversal may not avoid Rooker-Feldman.
It also reinforces that invoking ordinary state foreclosure and eviction mechanisms generally does not convert private lenders, servicers, or purchasers into state actors under Section 1983. Because this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, the proposed disposition remains subject to objections and review by the district judge.