Reported / Citable
Background
Jermaine Watts alleged that Fort Worth police officers used excessive force during his March 31, 2024 arrest, tasing him three times while he was nonresistant and on the ground. The court initially dismissed all of his claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed except as to excessive-force claims against Officer B. Ortega and an unidentified female officer.
On remand, Watts identified Officer B. Leon as the previously unidentified officer in a supplemental pleading signed June 8, 2026. Leon moved to dismiss on limitations grounds, while Ortega sought judgment on the pleadings, asserting that he was not involved in the arrest. Watts also sought to replace Ortega with Officer Sean Nguyen.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Mark T. Pittman dismissed the claim against Leon as untimely. Texas’s two-year personal-injury limitations period governs Watts’s Section 1983 claim, and the alleged injury occurred on March 31, 2024, making the deadline March 31, 2026. Watts’s later amendment identifying Leon did not relate back to his original Doe pleading under Fifth Circuit precedent.
The court rejected Watts’s tolling arguments. His asserted mental incapacity began after the claim accrued and therefore did not toll limitations under Texas law; the Prison Litigation Reform Act was inapplicable because the alleged force did not occur during incarceration; and alleged concealment of Leon’s identity did not establish fraudulent concealment of a cause of action. The court also granted Ortega judgment on the pleadings because police reports showed that Leon and another officer, not Ortega, participated in the arrest. It denied leave to substitute Nguyen because that claim would likewise be time-barred.
Key Takeaways
- In the Fifth Circuit, substituting a named defendant for a John Doe defendant does not relate back under Rule 15(c).
- A later-arising mental disability does not toll a Texas limitations period when the claim already accrued.
- Police reports incorporated into, and relied on by, a complaint can establish that a named officer was not involved in the alleged force.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the practical importance of identifying individual Section 1983 defendants before limitations expires. A plaintiff’s inability to determine an officer’s identity, without a viable basis for tolling, will not preserve a later claim against that officer.
It also shows that an excessive-force claim cannot proceed against an officer merely because the plaintiff believes discovery may establish involvement when the records on which the plaintiff relies identify different officers as participants.