Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Aries Marine Corporation chartered the liftboat L/B RAM XVII to Fieldwood Energy, LLC for work at an offshore platform. The vessel listed and eventually capsized after its port leg began sinking into the seabed. Six employees of Fieldwood subcontractor Fluid Crane & Construction, Inc. were aboard, and Fluid’s insurer, American Longshore Mutual Association, Ltd., paid them benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
After Aries sought exoneration from or limitation of liability, Fluid and American filed a claim seeking reimbursement. The district court held that a contractual waiver-of-subrogation clause favored Aries and dismissed American’s claim, while preserving its right to seek an offset under 33 U.S.C. § 933(f); the Fifth Circuit affirmed that ruling in an earlier appeal. After Aries settled with many remaining claimants, the district court dismissed the case but allowed any party claiming to have a live issue to seek reopening.
Fluid and American moved to reopen, asserting that they still had a direct general-maritime-law negligence claim under Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co. and that Fluid had an independent subrogation claim. The district court found that neither claim had been adequately pleaded or properly incorporated into the pretrial order, denied reopening, and later denied reconsideration.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to reopen and for reconsideration. Fluid and American’s initial claim did not adequately plead a Burnside cause of action. Although it referred to negligence and sought reimbursement for benefits and other expenses, those allegations were consistent with statutory subrogation and did not allege a duty owed and breached by Aries—the basis needed for a distinct direct tort claim.
The court also upheld the district court’s determination that the Burnside theory and Fluid’s purported independent subrogation right were not properly incorporated into the pretrial order. The district court had directed the parties to identify their claims in a particular section, but that section did not mention these theories. Given that the claims had not previously been properly asserted and the amendment deadline had passed, scattered references elsewhere in the lengthy proposed order did not provide adequate notice or amend the pleadings.
Key Takeaways
- A Burnside claim is a direct cause of action against a responsible third party and is distinct in nature and origin from an employer’s or carrier’s statutory subrogation rights.
- References to negligence and reimbursement do not adequately plead a Burnside claim when the claimant does not allege a duty owed and breached by the defendant.
- A pretrial order will not necessarily add an unpleaded claim when the theory appears only in sections other than the court-designated claims section and fails to give opposing parties fair notice.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that employers and compensation carriers pursuing maritime recovery must expressly plead any direct Burnside claim separately from statutory subrogation. General references to negligence or reimbursement may be insufficient to preserve that distinct theory.
It also confirms the broad discretion district courts possess to interpret and enforce pretrial orders narrowly. Parties should identify every claim in the section and manner the court requires rather than relying on scattered references to introduce new theories after pleading deadlines have expired.