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Uwagbai v. Jefferson Capital Systems — Court dismisses TCPA claim because text messages are not “calls” under the statute

Reported / Citable

Case
Fredrick Uwagbai v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC
Court
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston Division)
Date Decided
June 23, 2026
Docket No.
4:26-cv-02790
Topics
TCPA, Debt Collection, Consumer Protection, Motion to Dismiss

Background

Fredrick Uwagbai, proceeding pro se, sued debt collector Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC (“JCAP”) for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. Uwagbai claimed that JCAP sent him two pre-recorded text messages without his prior express consent. He originally filed suit in Harris County Justice Court on March 19, 2026, and JCAP removed the case to federal court on April 8, 2026, invoking federal question jurisdiction.

On May 15, 2026, JCAP moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the TCPA does not prohibit sending text messages. Uwagbai did not file a response to the motion. The court noted that a prior response Uwagbai had filed (Document No. 9) predated the motion by more than a month and therefore could not serve as a response to it.

The Court’s Holding

Judge David Hittner granted JCAP’s motion and dismissed Uwagbai’s claim with prejudice. The court held that the relevant provision of the TCPA — § 227(b)(1) — prohibits initiating a “telephone call” using an “artificial or prerecorded voice,” and that liability under the statute requires a defendant to have “made a call.” Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ybarra v. Dish Network, LLC, 807 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2015), the court emphasized that a prerecorded voice must actually play for a TCPA violation to occur.

After independently reviewing the record, the court found that the communications at issue were nothing more than text messages and that no telephone call was made. Because JCAP’s messages contained no audible voice component, the TCPA’s prohibition on prerecorded-voice calls was inapplicable, and Uwagbai’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Key Takeaways

  • The TCPA’s prerecorded-voice prohibition applies only to telephone calls in which a prerecorded voice actually plays — text messages, standing alone, do not trigger liability under § 227(b)(1).
  • Under Fifth Circuit precedent (Ybarra v. Dish Network), a defendant must have “made a call” for TCPA liability to attach; receiving a text message does not satisfy that element.
  • Failure to respond to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as non-opposition under S.D. Tex. Local Rule 7.4, though the court here independently evaluated the merits even without a response, and still found dismissal warranted.
  • Pro se pleadings are construed liberally, but liberal construction cannot cure a legally deficient claim where the conduct alleged simply does not fall within the statute’s reach.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces a significant limitation on TCPA claims that plaintiffs — and their counsel — should keep in mind: the statute’s prerecorded-voice provision is tethered to actual telephone calls, not all forms of automated electronic communication. Debt collectors and other businesses that communicate via text message face a meaningfully different legal landscape than those using robocalls, and courts in the Fifth Circuit will dismiss TCPA suits premised solely on text messages under the current statutory framework.

For consumer protection practitioners, the case also serves as a reminder that an unanswered motion to dismiss can be fatal. Although the court here examined the merits anyway, defendants can often obtain dismissal on the pleadings alone when plaintiffs — particularly unrepresented ones — fail to engage with dispositive arguments.

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