Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Miguel Angel Tobar Reinosa, a Salvadoran national, entered the United States without admission or parole in June 2019. He was apprehended, placed in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody, and released to his mother in August 2019. In 2023 he filed an asylum application with USCIS. In September 2025, he was arrested at the Galveston County Jail on a public lewdness charge and subsequently transferred to ICE custody, where he was served with a Notice to Appear charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without admission or parole.
His removal proceedings were briefly dismissed in November 2025 so USCIS could adjudicate his pending asylum application. After a USCIS interview, the asylum application was referred back to the immigration court, where it remains pending. In April 2026, Petitioner was served with a new Notice to Appear on the same inadmissibility charge. He has remained in immigration detention throughout.
Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his continued detention without a bond hearing violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and both substantive and procedural due process. Respondents moved for summary judgment, contending that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as an applicant for admission. Petitioner did not respond to the summary judgment motion despite a court-ordered deadline.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment and denied the habeas petition. Because Petitioner entered without admission, the court held he is deemed an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), citing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498, 502 (5th Cir. 2026).
The court further held that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) does not violate substantive or procedural due process. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003), the court reiterated that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process. On procedural due process, the court reasoned that because Petitioner’s rights regarding admission are limited to what Congress has provided by statute, and because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of admission applicants until specified proceedings conclude, he has no statutory or constitutional entitlement to a bond hearing.
Key Takeaways
- An alien who entered without admission or parole is classified as an “applicant for admission” and is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), regardless of how long they have been present in the country.
- Mandatory detention of admission applicants during removal proceedings does not violate substantive or procedural due process under Demore v. Kim and Fifth Circuit precedent.
- A pending asylum application does not entitle a § 1225(b)(2) detainee to a bond hearing; the right to seek admission is defined solely by what Congress has provided by statute.
- Failure to respond to a government motion for summary judgment, as required by a court’s scheduling order, leaves the petitioner without a counter-record and may contribute to a swift adverse ruling.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the broad sweep of mandatory immigration detention in the Southern District of Texas following the Fifth Circuit’s 2026 ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi. Courts in that circuit are consistently holding that individuals who entered without authorization — even those with long-pending asylum claims — fall within the mandatory detention regime of § 1225(b)(2) and have no procedural due process right to a bond hearing, a position that diverges from how some other circuits have treated similarly situated asylum seekers.
For immigration practitioners, the case underscores that a pending asylum application before USCIS or the immigration court does not serve as a shield against mandatory detention or a basis for obtaining a bond hearing. Attorneys representing clients in analogous postures must weigh whether circuit-level or Supreme Court challenges to the scope of § 1225(b)(2) offer viable avenues for relief.