Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jarrett Girard, a Hispanic gay man, alleged that he experienced years of harassment and disparate treatment while employed as a Corsicana police officer. His allegations included repeated questions and comments about his sexual orientation, ridicule based on gender stereotypes, racist remarks by his supervisor, selective discipline, denied transfer and training requests, and threats concerning his social-media activity.
Girard alleged that the treatment intensified after he complained internally that he was being targeted because he was gay and Hispanic. He further claimed that officials refused to select him for a detective position because of his complaints and that Chief Robert Johnson later disparaged him to a new employer, Navarro College, which then terminated him. Girard sued the city, its police department, and Johnson under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and asserted tortious interference with a contract.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and denied it in part. It held that Girard timely filed suit because the federal 90-day period began with the EEOC’s January 8, 2024 right-to-sue letter—not the earlier Texas Workforce Commission notice—and he sued 88 days later.
The court allowed Girard’s Title VII sex-discrimination and retaliation claims against the city to proceed. His allegations plausibly supported both sex-based disparate treatment and a sex-based hostile work environment, including harassment tied to sexual orientation and gender stereotyping. The court also allowed the tortious-interference claim against the city to proceed because the city had not shown that Title VII preempted the claim outside the federal-employment context.
The court dismissed all claims against the police department and the Title VII claims against Johnson because the department was a nonjural entity and individuals are not liable under Title VII. It also dismissed the Section 1981 claims against Johnson and the city’s Section 1981 sex-discrimination claim, while dismissing without prejudice the remaining inadequately pleaded Section 1981 claims, the tortious-interference claim against Johnson, and the Title VII national-origin claims against the city. Girard received leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice by March 10, 2025.
Key Takeaways
- An EEOC right-to-sue letter, not a Texas Workforce Commission notice, triggers Title VII’s federal 90-day filing period.
- At the pleading stage, a Title VII plaintiff need not allege an “ultimate employment decision”; a non-de-minimis injury affecting employment terms, conditions, or privileges can suffice.
- Section 1981 claims against state actors must be pursued through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VII does not impose individual liability on supervisors.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the Fifth Circuit’s post-Hamilton standard for adverse employment actions and confirms that sexual-orientation discrimination and gender-stereotyping allegations can support Title VII disparate-treatment and hostile-work-environment claims.
It also highlights important pleading distinctions in public-employer litigation: plaintiffs must route Section 1981 claims through Section 1983, avoid duplicative official-capacity claims, and address the Texas Tort Claims Act when asserting tort claims against government employees.