Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A jury convicted Christian Carmona in two jointly tried cases of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The complainant, E.K., testified that when she was 14 and working at a sandwich shop, Carmona—then 30 and a shift lead—rubbed her vagina through her jeans on one occasion and reached under her shirt and bra to grab her bare breast on another. The jury assessed 12 years of confinement in each case, and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
The State also introduced messages attributed to Carmona in which the sender discussed “groping” and “petting” E.K. and asked whether he had gone too far physically. Carmona argued that the messages were fabricated and presented expert testimony demonstrating how text-message screenshots could be falsified. Over his objection, the trial court admitted an email from another teenage employee, E.S., reporting that Carmona was overly touchy, had pressed his stomach against her back, placed his hands over hers, and breathed in her ear.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions. E.K.’s testimony established that Carmona touched her genitals through clothing and her bare breast when she was younger than 17, and her testimony alone could sustain the verdicts. The attributed messages provided additional evidence of the touching and supported an inference that Carmona acted with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. Conflicting evidence concerning the store cameras and the absence of the messages from Carmona’s phone presented credibility questions for the jury.
The court also held that admitting E.S.’s email was not an abuse of discretion. Article 38.37’s hearing-and-finding requirements did not apply because the email described contact involving Carmona’s stomach and hands, not conduct constituting one of the statute’s enumerated offenses. Under the ordinary evidence rules, the email was admissible to rebut Carmona’s fabrication theory and to impeach the shop owner’s testimony concerning reported misconduct. Its probative value was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. The court affirmed both judgments.
Key Takeaways
- A child complainant’s testimony can, standing alone, provide sufficient evidence to support an indecency-with-a-child conviction under Texas law.
- Article 38.37’s special hearing requirement applies only when the proffered evidence describes an enumerated offense; the email’s description of stomach-to-back and hand contact did not qualify.
- Extraneous-act evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(b) to rebut a fabrication defense or correct a misleading impression created by a witness, subject to Rule 403.
Why It Matters
The opinion distinguishes evidence admitted under article 38.37 from evidence governed by the ordinary Texas Rules of Evidence. When an alleged act does not amount to an offense enumerated in article 38.37, the statute’s preliminary hearing and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding are not required, though Rules 404(b) and 403 still constrain admissibility.
The decision also illustrates the breadth of permissible rebuttal once a defendant advances a fabrication theory and reinforces appellate deference to a jury’s resolution of credibility disputes in child-sexual-contact cases.