Reported / Citable
Background
Jane Doe (L.M.H.) sued Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Wyndham Hotel Group, Days Inn Worldwide, and AAP Redevelopment under the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986 (CAVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Her allegations concern personal injuries she suffered while being trafficked at a St. Louis Days Inn.
The defendants moved to dismiss, and AAP Redevelopment alternatively sought transfer. A magistrate judge recommended denying both motions. AAP did not object. The Wyndham defendants objected, principally arguing that CAVRA permits suits only against perpetrators of the underlying enumerated offenses and does not recognize vicarious liability.
The Court’s Holding
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denied all defendants’ motions. It held that § 2255(a)’s plain language does not restrict civil liability to a person who personally committed an enumerated crime. Instead, the provision reaches those legally responsible for causing a plaintiff’s personal injury resulting from such a violation.
The court also concluded that ordinary tort-based vicarious-liability principles apply to CAVRA. Because L.M.H. adequately pleaded an agency relationship between the Wyndham defendants and AAP Redevelopment—and the Wyndham defendants did not specifically object to that finding—the CAVRA claim against the Wyndham defendants could proceed. The court additionally declined to certify an interlocutory appeal, finding no substantial ground for disagreement based merely on defendants’ contrary statutory interpretation and observing that an appeal would not materially shorten the litigation.
Key Takeaways
- CAVRA’s civil remedy is not limited by its text to defendants who personally perpetrated an enumerated offense.
- Ordinary tort principles, including a principal’s potential liability for an agent’s torts, may support liability under § 2255(a).
- The court denied dismissal and transfer, declined interlocutory-appeal certification, and held that the Wyndham defendants’ waivers of service established personal jurisdiction under the statute’s nationwide-service provision.
Why It Matters
The decision adopts a broader reading of CAVRA’s civil-remedy provision, allowing a child sex-trafficking survivor to pursue claims against entities alleged to be legally responsible for trafficking-related injuries even when they are not alleged to have personally committed the underlying offense.
The ruling is procedural rather than a final determination of liability. It holds that L.M.H.’s allegations are sufficient to proceed beyond the pleading stage, leaving the merits of her claims for later resolution.