Reported / Citable
Background
Marlene Milagro Lugo-Martin, a Cuban national, entered the United States without inspection in 2022 and was initially apprehended by immigration officials before being released into the country. She remained continuously present in the United States for over three years with no criminal history. On November 14, 2025, she was re-detained at a routine ICE check-in appointment and was subsequently denied a bond hearing on at least two occasions.
Her detention arose in the context of a significant policy shift: in July 2025, DHS and DOJ issued interim guidance interpreting the mandatory detention provision of INA Section 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, to apply to all noncitizens who have not been formally admitted — including those who entered without inspection. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted this position in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit upheld that statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), confirming that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission regardless of whether they are actively seeking admission at the time of detention.
Lugo-Martin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that her prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights. While the petition was pending, an Immigration Judge ordered her removed, but she appealed to the BIA, leaving the removal order non-final. The Government moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Buenrostro mandated her detention and that no due process violation had occurred.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part, finding that Lugo-Martin’s detention without constitutionally adequate procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and ordering her immediate release. The court held that Buenrostro, while affirming the Government’s statutory authority to detain her under Section 1225(b)(2), did not foreclose an as-applied due process challenge to that detention. Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found that her liberty interest — grounded in over three years of continuous U.S. residence and a prior release that created a reasonable expectation of freedom from detention — outweighed the government’s procedural posture of denying any bond hearing.
The court relied heavily on its own prior ruling in Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026), incorporating that decision’s legal framework and finding the facts here distinguishable only in that Lugo-Martin’s longer residence since 2022 independently satisfied the liberty-interest threshold. The court further found that her prior release from detention in 2022 — with no alleged violation of conditions — strengthened her liberty interest by creating an expectation, rooted in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), that she would remain free or at least be entitled to seek bond during removal proceedings.
Rather than ordering a bond hearing, the court ordered outright release, reasoning that: (1) the Fifth Circuit has held Section 1226(a)’s bond-hearing mechanism does not apply to applicants for admission; (2) a post-hoc hearing would not remedy the already-suffered deprivation of liberty; and (3) the BIA’s position that it lacks jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for those detained under Section 1225(b)(2) made any ordered hearing practically futile. Respondents were ordered to release Lugo-Martin by June 2, 2026, return her identity documents and personal effects, and provide two hours’ advance notice to her counsel of the time and location of release.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all unadmitted noncitizens does not extinguish as-applied Fifth Amendment due process challenges to mandatory detention without a bond hearing.
- A noncitizen’s multi-year U.S. residence and prior release from immigration custody can together establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring individualized justification — i.e., a bond hearing — before continued civil detention.
- Where a bond hearing would be futile because neither Section 1226(a) nor BIA jurisdiction applies, a district court may order immediate release as the appropriate habeas remedy for a due process violation.
- This decision is part of a broader pattern of Southern District of Texas rulings — including Bonilla Chicas v. Warden and Bonilla Barrios v. Noem — applying due process limits on the government’s expanded mandatory detention policy.
Why It Matters
This decision highlights a significant constitutional fault line in the government’s post-2025 immigration detention policy. Even after the Fifth Circuit blessed the statutory reach of Section 1225(b)(2) in Buenrostro-Mendez, district courts in the Southern District of Texas have consistently held that the Constitution imposes an independent floor: individuals with substantial ties to the United States and a history of compliant prior release cannot be indefinitely detained in civil immigration custody without any individualized determination of risk or flight. The ruling signals that statutory authority alone does not insulate detention from due process scrutiny.
For practitioners, the case reinforces that habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains a viable vehicle for challenging prolonged mandatory immigration detention on due process grounds, even within the Fifth Circuit, and that courts may order release — not merely a bond hearing — when procedural remedies are structurally unavailable. With Lugo-Martin’s BIA appeal still pending, the case also underscores that noncitizens in non-final removal proceedings retain cognizable liberty interests that courts will protect.