Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Wendell Williams was convicted in May 2016 of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a felony punishable by more than one year in prison. In May 2026, a federal grand jury indicted him for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) or 924(a)(8).
Williams moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, is unconstitutionally vague, and violates the Second Amendment under the historical-tradition test articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that Williams’s Commerce Clause argument was foreclosed by binding Fifth Circuit precedent recognizing § 922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power. Williams conceded that circuit precedent squarely opposed his position and identified no binding authority to the contrary.
The court likewise rejected the vagueness challenge under Fifth Circuit decisions upholding the provision against that objection. As to the Second Amendment, the court concluded that Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Williams’s facial challenge because § 922(g)(1) has at least one constitutional application. The court therefore found it unnecessary to conduct an exhaustive historical analysis, while also observing that firearm rights have never been unlimited and that longstanding restrictions on firearm possession by felons remain undisturbed.
Key Takeaways
- Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in the Fifth Circuit as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
- Fifth Circuit precedent also forecloses a void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal felon-in-possession prohibition.
- A facial Second Amendment challenge fails where binding precedent establishes at least one constitutional application of § 922(g)(1).
Why It Matters
The ruling illustrates that district courts in the Fifth Circuit remain bound by circuit decisions rejecting broad constitutional attacks on § 922(g)(1), including after Bruen. Defendants seeking dismissal cannot rely on unsettled arguments or pending en banc proceedings when existing circuit precedent directly controls.
The decision addresses a facial challenge only and does not undertake a full historical analysis of every possible application of the felon-in-possession statute.