Reported / Citable
Background
Jonathan C. Drewa alleged that he visited the San Antonio Zoo in December 2023 with his service dog, which he said was well behaved and under his control. Zoo employees required him to complete paperwork before admitting him with the dog. Drewa refused, accused the employees of violating the law, and was told that police would be called if he did not leave.
Drewa sued the zoo operator under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Texas Human Resources Code, and Texas intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress law. After Drewa amended his complaint, the magistrate judge gave notice that he would assess the amended pleading’s sufficiency sua sponte; neither party objected.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Henry J. Bemporad recommended dismissing the ADA and Texas Human Resources Code claims without prejudice and permitting one final amendment. The complaint did not plausibly allege that Drewa had a qualifying disability: it referred generally to multiple medical conditions and included a doctor’s note saying the dog was medically indicated, but did not explain how an impairment substantially limited a major life activity under the ADA or otherwise established a qualifying disability under Texas law.
The magistrate judge also found that the pleading did not allege that the dog was trained to perform work or tasks for Drewa’s benefit, as required for a service animal under the ADA. Although a public accommodation cannot require service-animal certification or training documentation, a plaintiff must still plead facts supporting disability status and the animal’s qualifying training.
The judge recommended dismissing the IIED claim with prejudice. Requiring paperwork and threatening to call police if Drewa did not leave were not extreme and outrageous conduct, and the pleaded facts showed that excluding him pending paperwork—not causing emotional distress—was the intended consequence. Amendment could not cure those defects.
Key Takeaways
- A service-dog user must still plead facts showing a qualifying disability and that the animal is trained to perform disability-related work or tasks.
- A business generally may not require service-animal certification or training documentation, but that rule does not eliminate a plaintiff’s pleading burden.
- Under Texas law, a disputed admission condition and threat to call police did not plausibly support an IIED claim on these allegations.
Why It Matters
The recommendation distinguishes between an allegedly unlawful service-animal policy and a sufficiently pleaded discrimination claim. It leaves Drewa an opportunity to supply facts supporting his ADA and Texas disability-access claims while treating the emotional-distress theory as legally unavailable on the alleged conduct.
Because this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district judge had not yet entered a final ruling on the recommended disposition.