Reported / Citable
Background
Wyatt Ellis Busby, a Texas state prisoner, was convicted of murder with a deadly weapon in Harris County in January 2022 and sentenced to fifty years in prison. The Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in December 2023, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review on April 3, 2024. Busby did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, making his conviction final for federal habeas purposes on July 2, 2024 — ninety days after the denial of discretionary review.
Busby filed multiple state habeas applications, but all were filed before his conviction became final and were dismissed as procedurally improper or noncompliant with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. He also filed several prior federal habeas petitions. On November 25, 2025, he mailed the current federal petition — initially filed in the Eastern District of Texas and transferred to the Southern District — raising claims of trial court error and malicious prosecution and seeking vacatur of his conviction and expungement of his record.
The respondent, TDCJ Executive Director Eric Guerrero, answered and asserted that the petition was barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Busby did not reply to the answer or offer any explanation for the late filing.
The Court’s Holding
Judge David Hittner dismissed the petition with prejudice as time-barred. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), Busby had one year from July 2, 2024 — when his conviction became final — to file a timely federal habeas petition, setting a deadline of July 2, 2025. His petition, filed December 1, 2025, was approximately five months late.
The court found no basis for statutory tolling. Busby’s state habeas applications could not toll the limitations period because they were filed before his conviction became final and were dismissed for procedural noncompliance, rendering them not “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). His prior federal habeas petitions likewise provided no tolling, as federal petitions do not toll the AEDPA limitations period under Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). Busby also failed to allege facts supporting any other statutory exception — including unconstitutional state impediment, a newly recognized constitutional right, or late-discovered factual predicates.
The court also denied equitable tolling, finding that Busby presented no facts demonstrating diligent pursuit of his rights or an extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing. Even after the respondent raised limitations as a defense, Busby offered no explanation for the delay. The court denied a certificate of appealability, concluding that reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable.
Key Takeaways
- Under AEDPA, a Texas prisoner’s conviction becomes final — and the one-year federal habeas clock begins — ninety days after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies discretionary review, when the window to seek U.S. Supreme Court certiorari expires.
- State habeas applications filed before a conviction becomes final are not “properly filed” and do not toll AEDPA’s limitations period; likewise, applications dismissed for procedural noncompliance provide no tolling benefit.
- Federal habeas petitions, even if properly filed, do not toll the AEDPA limitations period under Duncan v. Walker.
- Equitable tolling requires both diligent pursuit of rights and an extraordinary external circumstance — a petitioner’s silence in the face of a limitations defense, with no explanation for the delay, is fatal to any equitable tolling claim.
Why It Matters
This case illustrates how AEDPA’s one-year limitations period operates as a strict gatekeeper in federal habeas practice, particularly for pro se prisoners who file premature or procedurally defective state applications and assume those filings are preserving their federal rights. The decision reinforces that only “properly filed” state collateral attacks — those accepted in compliance with state procedural rules and filed after the judgment is final — can pause the federal clock.
For practitioners advising incarcerated clients or handling post-conviction matters, the case underscores the importance of calendar discipline after direct review concludes: the ninety-day certiorari window runs whether or not the petitioner intends to seek Supreme Court review, and the federal habeas deadline runs from that date regardless of how many prior petitions — state or federal — were filed prematurely or rejected on procedural grounds.