Reported / Citable
Background
Philips E. Matthew alleged that BBVA Bank improperly reported deferred mortgage payments as delinquent. PNC Bank later acquired BBVA’s assets and liabilities. Matthew sued PNC in Texas state court, initially asserting an FCRA claim along with state-law claims, and PNC removed the action to federal court.
Matthew then amended his complaint to omit the federal claim and assert Texas-law claims for negligent credit reporting, defamation or injury to credit reputation, and negligent failure to correct known errors. He later filed additional amended complaints without leave of court.
The Court’s Holding
Judge David Hittner struck Matthew’s second and third amended complaints because they were filed without leave after he had already amended once. The court denied Matthew’s request for leave to file the third amended complaint, leaving the March 9 first amended complaint as the operative pleading.
The court granted PNC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed all claims. Matthew’s allegations—that PNC furnished inaccurate information to consumer reporting agencies, failed to investigate and correct it, and continued reporting it—concern conduct regulated by FCRA section 1681s-2. His Texas-law claims were therefore expressly preempted. The court also noted that the complaint did not allege facts showing malice or willful intent to injure.
Key Takeaways
- FCRA section 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts state-law claims targeting a furnisher’s credit-reporting and investigation conduct.
- A plaintiff cannot avoid preemption merely by omitting an FCRA claim and pleading state-law theories based on the same conduct.
- After amending once as of right, a party must obtain leave before filing further amended complaints.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the FCRA’s broad furnisher preemption provision to state negligence and defamation theories arising from allegedly inaccurate mortgage reporting. Plaintiffs challenging a furnisher’s reporting practices must account for federal preemption and, for claims in the nature of defamation or negligence, plead facts supporting any applicable malice or willful-intent exception.