Reported / Citable
Background
Jorge Arturo Jimenez Jimenez, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in approximately September 2001 and had lived in the country for over twenty-five years before his arrest. He is married to a U.S. citizen and held an approved I-130 family petition and I-601A unlawful presence waiver. On May 13, 2026, ICE detained him following a traffic stop and held him at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas. The government asserted authority to detain him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention, meaning no bond hearing was provided.
Jimenez Jimenez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on June 9, 2026, arguing that his indefinite detention without any individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, among other claims. Judge Robert Pitman ordered the government to show cause within three days. Respondents — including Field Office Director Miguel Vergara and other federal officials — opposed the petition, contending that § 1225(b)(2) mandated detention and that the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), foreclosed relief.
The court had previously held that § 1225(b)(2) did not apply to long-term residents like Jimenez Jimenez, but that statutory interpretation was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Buenrostro-Mendez. Judge Pitman therefore turned exclusively to the constitutional question — whether detention without a bond hearing violated procedural due process — an issue the Fifth Circuit expressly left unaddressed in Buenrostro-Mendez.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the habeas petition, holding that detaining Jimenez Jimenez under § 1225(b)(2) without any opportunity to challenge his detention through a bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Applying the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found all three factors favored the petitioner: he possessed a strong liberty interest after more than twenty-five years of life in the United States; the risk of erroneous deprivation was severe because he had no mechanism to contest his detention; and the government’s interest in forgoing bond hearings was diminished by the fact that such hearings had been conducted for decades until the government’s recent reinterpretation of § 1225(b).
The court rejected the government’s argument that Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), foreclosed Jimenez Jimenez’s due process claims, distinguishing that case on two grounds: unlike the petitioner in Thuraissigiam, Jimenez Jimenez was not apprehended at the border but had established deep ties after decades of residence, and he did not seek a right to remain in the United States but merely the opportunity to apply for release. The court also declined to follow the unpublished Fifth Circuit decision in Wekesa v. United States Attorney as non-binding and factually distinguishable. The court likewise found the government’s reliance on Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), unpersuasive, noting that flight risk and dangerousness are in fact relevant under § 1225(b) because the statute permits parole on humanitarian grounds for those who present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.
Concluding that immediate release — not merely a future bond hearing — was the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation already suffered, the court ordered Respondents to release Jimenez Jimenez immediately, return his identification documents, and refrain from re-detaining him without first conducting a bond hearing at which the government bears the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez resolved only the statutory question of whether § 1225(b)(2) applies to long-term residents; it left open — and does not foreclose — an independent due process challenge to detention without a bond hearing.
- A noncitizen who has lived in the United States for decades retains a strong Fifth Amendment liberty interest distinguishing him from a recent border-crosser, and detention without any individualized assessment of flight risk or danger violates procedural due process under Mathews v. Eldridge.
- Although § 1225(b)(2) is commonly called “mandatory detention,” the statute’s parole provision makes flight risk and dangerousness relevant factors, undermining the government’s argument that a bond hearing would serve no purpose.
- When detention is found to be constitutionally unlawful, immediate release — not a post-deprivation bond hearing — is the proper remedy because the deprivation of liberty has already occurred without adequate process.
- Respondents who seek to re-detain the petitioner must first conduct a bond hearing and bear the burden of justifying detention by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or flight risk.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of rulings from federal district courts in Texas — and across the country — holding that the government’s 2025 reinterpretation of § 1225(b)(2) to cover long-term undocumented residents cannot be applied without constitutional safeguards. By grounding its holding entirely in the Due Process Clause rather than statutory interpretation, the court insulates its ruling from the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in Buenrostro-Mendez and aligns with numerous sister-court decisions that likewise found the constitutional question unresolved by that panel.
For immigration practitioners, the decision reinforces the viability of as-applied due process challenges for clients who have spent years or decades in the United States and are now subjected to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) following the government’s policy shift. The court’s imposition of a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard at any subsequent bond hearing, and its choice of immediate release over remand for process, signal that courts are treating lengthy pre-hearing detention of long-term residents as a serious constitutional harm requiring prompt remedy.