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Wells v. Johnson — Affirmed dismissal of § 1983 civil rights claims against Louisiana judges based on judicial immunity and lack of “persons” status

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Kelvin Wells v. Ronald Johnson, Beau Higginbotham, Tarvald Smith, and Doug Welborn
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Judge
Higginbotham (Ronald Reagan, 1982); Engelhardt (Donald Trump, 2018); Ramirez (Joseph R. Biden Jr., 2023)
Date Decided
July 14, 2026
Docket No.
Nos. 25-30685 and 25-30711 (consolidated)
Topics
Civil rights, Judicial immunity, § 1983 liability, State sovereign immunity
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Kelvin Wells, proceeding pro se, sued four Louisiana state judges in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued Judges Ronald Johnson, Beau Higginbotham, and Tarvald Smith in both their individual and official capacities, alleging violations of due process and equal protection under the U.S. and Louisiana constitutions, along with other procedural complaints. The judges had presided over Wells’s lawsuits in state court. The defendants removed the case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Wells opposed the motion to dismiss and moved to remand the case to state court. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice on two independent grounds: first, that the defendants were not “persons” susceptible to suit under § 1983 in their official capacities; and second, that they were entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their individual-capacity claims. Wells appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. On the official-capacity claims, the court held that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Because the defendant-judges are agents of the state of Louisiana, they cannot be sued in their official capacities under § 1983. The court noted that judicial immunity was an alternative basis for dismissal but was not necessary to reach this ground.

On the individual-capacity claims, the court affirmed dismissal based on judicial immunity. A judge is immune from lawsuits arising from judicial actions performed within the bounds of the court’s jurisdiction. Wells’s complaints about the defendants’ conduct in managing his court filings and courtroom proceedings all constitute quintessentially judicial acts routinely performed by judges. The court found that Wells failed to allege facts showing either “nonjudicial actions” or actions taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Therefore, judicial immunity barred the individual-capacity claims.

Key Takeaways

  • States and state officials sued in their official capacities cannot be “persons” under § 1983, making official-capacity suits against state judges categorically barred.
  • Judges have absolute immunity from suits arising from judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction, regardless of whether those acts were erroneous or unconstitutional.
  • Management of court filings and courtroom proceedings are paradigmatic judicial acts protected by immunity.
  • Pro se litigants must allege plausible facts, not mere conclusory allegations; liberal construction does not override the requirement to state a plausible claim.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces fundamental barriers to federal civil rights litigation against state judges. Section 1983 cannot be weaponized against judges for decisions or management of their judicial responsibilities, protecting judicial independence and the finality of state court proceedings. The dual bars—lack of “persons” status for official-capacity suits and absolute immunity for individual-capacity suits—make it virtually impossible for litigants to obtain federal-court review of state judge conduct through § 1983.

For practitioners, the case underscores that complaints about judicial rulings, case management, or courtroom proceedings must be pursued through established remedies like appeals or state judicial disciplinary processes, not through federal civil rights actions. Even when courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, they will not overlook the threshold requirements of § 1983 liability or the immunity doctrines that protect judicial officers.

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