Reported / Citable
Background
Erfan Rahimzadeh, an Iranian citizen, was apprehended while crossing into the United States without inspection near Eagle Pass, Texas, on December 24, 2022. He was convicted in the Western District of Texas of failure to comply with report documents and sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. After his release from criminal custody, ICE detained him pending removal to Iran.
An Immigration Judge denied Rahimzadeh’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, ordering his removal to Iran on November 26, 2024. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 18, 2025, making the removal order administratively final. Despite this final order, no travel documents have been obtained and no removal flights are available due to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States following military conflict in February 2026. Rahimzadeh has now been in continuous detention for approximately three and a half years.
Rahimzadeh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the constitutionality of his indefinite detention. He argued that under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), removal is not reasonably foreseeable and therefore continued detention violates the Constitution.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommended granting Rahimzadeh’s habeas petition and ordering his immediate release under DHS supervision. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that removal remains reasonably foreseeable under the Zadvydas framework. Although Zadvydas presumes a six-month detention period is constitutional, the presumption is rebuttable. Once a detainee presents evidence that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must provide rebuttal evidence—which the respondents failed to do here.
The court rejected respondents’ arguments that Rahimzadeh’s brief refusal to sign Form I-229(a) (a warning form for failure to depart) constituted non-cooperation sufficient to toll the removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). The refusal was isolated, preceded any consultation with counsel, and was followed by consistent cooperation with removal efforts since October 2025. The court found this insufficient to establish bad faith. The court also held that changed circumstances—specifically the Iran-US conflict and diplomatic breakdown—are properly considered in evaluating whether removal remains reasonably foreseeable, contrary to respondents’ argument that the analysis should be frozen at the time the petition was filed.
Critically, the court found that respondents could provide no timeline for when flights to Iran might resume, and no viable third-country removal options are being pursued despite statutory authorization for such removal. The respondents themselves acknowledged that all commercial and charter removals to Iran are currently paused. Without a reasonably foreseeable removal mechanism, the court concluded detention could no longer be authorized by statute.
Key Takeaways
- Detention of an alien post-removal-order is constitutional only if removal remains reasonably foreseeable; the six-month presumption is rebuttable once the detainee shifts the burden to the government.
- A single refusal to sign administrative paperwork before consulting counsel, followed by consistent cooperation, does not constitute non-cooperation sufficient to toll the removal period.
- Intervening geopolitical events, such as diplomatic breakdown or conflict, are properly considered in evaluating whether removal remains reasonably foreseeable; habeas review is not frozen in time.
- Absent a realistic mechanism for removal—whether direct or via third-country resettlement—and absent special circumstances such as dangerousness, indefinite detention violates the Constitution.
Why It Matters
This decision applies Supreme Court precedent to a contemporary crisis scenario in which geopolitical conflict renders removal impossible. It clarifies that immigration authorities cannot maintain indefinite detention based on a formally valid removal order when actual removal has become practically impossible. The decision also limits respondents’ ability to manufacture non-cooperation findings by characterizing isolated acts (especially those preceded by attorney communications) as evidence of bad faith.
For immigration practitioners and detainees, the case underscores that Zadvydas protection does not evaporate simply because a final order exists. The statutory six-month detention presumption, while strong, yields to contemporary facts showing removal is not reasonably foreseeable. The court’s holding that the government must identify a concrete, realistic removal pathway—not merely assert that conditions might improve—sets a meaningful standard for detention justification in cases involving hostile or unstable destination countries.