Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Nelson Ngele Nkembi, a citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States without inspection and was apprehended, resulting in his placement in federal immigration custody on January 2, 2025. An immigration judge ordered him removed on July 9, 2025. Nkembi appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on July 30, 2025, and while that appeal was pending, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court challenging the lawfulness of his continued detention.
The BIA dismissed Nkembi’s appeal on May 14, 2026, making his removal order administratively final. Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nkembi’s detention authority derives from Section 1231 and is therefore presumed reasonable under the framework established in Zadvydas v. Davis. Nkembi contended he was still entitled to habeas relief, citing his pending Fifth Circuit appeal and stay of removal request.
The Court’s Holding
The district court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Nkembi’s habeas petition without prejudice as premature. The court held that under Section 1231 and Zadvydas v. Davis, detention following a final removal order is presumed reasonable for six months. Because Nkembi’s removal order became final on May 14, 2026—when the BIA dismissed his appeal—and he had been detained in post-removal custody for only approximately two months at the time of the ruling, he remained well within the presumptively reasonable detention period.
The court noted that Nkembi failed to present facts or evidence sufficient to overcome the six-month presumption of reasonableness. The opinion emphasized that under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, challenges to prolonged detention are premature when the petitioner has not exceeded the presumptively reasonable detention period. Accordingly, the court found that Nkembi had not demonstrated his detention was unlawful.
Key Takeaways
- Detention under Section 1231 following a final removal order is presumed reasonable for six months from the date the order becomes administratively final.
- A removal order becomes final upon dismissal of a BIA appeal, and detention time is measured from that date forward.
- Habeas petitions challenging immigration detention are premature and subject to dismissal if filed before the petitioner exceeds the six-month presumption period without additional evidence of prolonged, unreasonable detention.
- Pending appeals or stay requests to higher courts do not toll or extend the six-month presumption period for detention purposes.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the practical application of Zadvydas v. Davis to immigration detention cases and the significant threshold immigrants must clear to mount successful habeas challenges. The six-month presumption creates a procedural barrier that prevents early-stage challenges to removal-based detention, even where a detainee has appealed or sought stays. For immigration practitioners, the ruling confirms that habeas strategies must account for the timing of the administratively final removal order, not earlier procedural events.
The case reflects broader judicial deference to detention determinations in immigration cases. By dismissing Nkembi’s petition as premature rather than on the merits, the court preserved his right to refile if his detention extends beyond six months without a likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. However, the ruling underscores that immigration detainees face a substantial waiting period before federal courts will entertain challenges to the conditions or duration of their confinement.