Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Curlee was convicted by jury of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a young child under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, involving two different child victims. He was sentenced to consecutive life sentences. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on a Friday, the trial court scheduled the punishment phase to begin the following Tuesday. While in custody at the courthouse, Curlee used a disassembled firearm he had concealed on his person to shoot himself in the head. He survived but was rendered blind.
Before the punishment phase commenced, Curlee’s counsel filed motions suggesting incompetency and seeking a continuance based on the suicide attempt and resulting hospitalization. The trial court denied the continuance and proceeded with the punishment phase in Curlee’s absence, characterizing his absence as voluntary under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 33.03. On appeal, Curlee raised issues concerning jury sequestration, competency determination, voluntary absence, and court costs assessment.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that while the trial court erred in refusing to sequester the jury after the guilt-innocence phase—which Texas law mandates upon request—the error was harmless because the record showed no evidence that jurors violated the trial court’s instructions during the recess. On competency, the court was initially remanded to conduct a retrospective evaluation. A psychologist found Curlee competent at the time of the punishment phase, testifying that Curlee admitted he had planned the suicide attempt before trial began and that it was a “calculated response to an unfavorable verdict,” not the result of mental illness or incompetency.
Most significantly, the court affirmed that Curlee’s absence constituted voluntary absence from trial. The court held that a defendant may be found to have voluntarily absented himself even when hospitalized following a suicide attempt, provided the attempt is calculated and volitional rather than stemming from mental illness. The court rejected Curlee’s argument that hospital restrictions on counsel access rendered him incompetent, noting that competency under Texas law focuses solely on mental capacity to consult with counsel, not external access to counsel. Finally, the court found the trial court correctly assessed court costs only once in the combined trial of both cases, as required by statute.
Key Takeaways
- A jury sequestration violation is harmless error when no evidence shows jurors violated the trial court’s instructions during separation
- A defendant’s calculated suicide attempt after conviction may constitute voluntary absence permitting trial to proceed, even during hospitalization
- Competency determinations focus exclusively on the defendant’s mental capacity, not external circumstances or restrictions on counsel access
- When multiple cases are tried together, court costs must be assessed only once, not duplicated across judgments
Why It Matters
This decision establishes important boundaries on how Texas courts address defendant absence due to self-harm. By holding that a calculated suicide attempt constitutes voluntary absence, the court prevents defendants from circumventing the punishment phase through intentional self-infliction of injury. The ruling clarifies that courts are not required to delay trial proceedings when a defendant’s physical incapacity results from volitional conduct rather than mental illness. This distinction matters because it prevents defendants from weaponizing mental health crises as litigation delays while preserving protections for those whose incapacity stems from genuine mental defect.
The decision also reinforces the narrow scope of competency determinations under Texas law. By holding that hospital restrictions on counsel access do not factor into competency analysis, the court ensures that logistical or external barriers do not derail criminal proceedings once a defendant’s mental capacity has been established. This clarification prevents competency doctrine from expanding beyond its psychiatric moorings into areas of trial management and access rights, which are addressed through separate procedural mechanisms like continuance motions.