Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Brianna Day, a biology professor at Dallas College, worked there from August 2015 until August 2021. During her tenure, Day engaged in protected activity under Title VII: she filed discrimination grievances on her own behalf and represented other faculty members in their discrimination grievances against the College based on ethnicity, sex, and age. In May 2020, Day helped establish a chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) at Dallas College and served as its president. She also proposed the formation of a faculty senate.
Day alleges that College administrators and faculty members retaliated against her advocacy efforts by creating a hostile work environment through coordinated attacks and threats of reprisals against the entire faculty. On August 2, 2021, Day resigned from her full-time position, effective August 15. Shortly after, she requested permission to continue teaching three of her previously scheduled online courses as an adjunct professor for Fall 2021. The Biology department chair approved this request via email. However, on August 17, 2021—two days before her resignation became effective—Day discovered she had been removed from all her adjunct courses without explanation. On August 27, Day emailed the College’s Chief HR Officer threatening to file a grievance for retaliation. The HR officer denied any retaliatory intent and claimed no paperwork existed regarding Day’s adjunct status. The EEOC later found reasonable cause to believe the College violated Title VII.
Day brought two claims: Title VII retaliation and breach of contract. Dallas College moved for summary judgment on both claims. The court struck portions of Day’s declaration containing hearsay and statements lacking personal knowledge before addressing the motion.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim but denied it on the retaliation claim. Under Texas law, employee handbooks and policy manuals do not create implied contracts between employer and employee; they serve only as general guidelines. Because Day’s employment was at-will and the College’s contract language bound Day to comply with policies rather than binding the College to contractual obligations, Day failed to state a breach of contract claim.
On the Title VII retaliation claim, the court applied the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The court found that Day established a prima facie case: (1) she engaged in protected activity by filing and assisting with discrimination grievances, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action when denied adjunct teaching after approval, and (3) a causal link existed because the HR Chief testified that she considered Day’s retaliation allegations when determining how to respond to Day’s inquiry. Dallas College articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason—an administrative error caused by the timing of Day’s resignation relative to implementation of a new centralized scheduling system. However, the court found a genuine dispute of material fact regarding pretext.
The court identified critical evidence of pretext: Dallas College never explained the administrative-error rationale to Day; she learned of it only four years later at the HR Chief’s deposition. More significantly, another Biology professor, Joseph Malaer, resigned two months after Day and requested to continue as adjunct faculty. Despite encountering the same administrative error, Malaer’s request was honored, and he taught in Fall 2021 and Spring 2022. The College inadequately explained this disparate treatment. When Day sought adjunct courses again in October 2021—after the scheduling system issues were resolved—she was still denied assignment and given no explanation. This pattern of conduct raised a genuine issue regarding whether the administrative-error explanation was pretextual.
Key Takeaways
- Employee handbooks do not create binding contracts on employers under Texas law; they bind employees through at-will employment conditions.
- Representing colleagues in discrimination grievances constitutes protected activity under Title VII’s participation clause, shielding employees from retaliation.
- Pretext can be established through disparate treatment of similarly situated employees, particularly when the employer’s explanation is withheld from the affected employee and only disclosed during discovery.
- Employer silence on reasons for adverse employment action, combined with opportunity to correct the harm and failure to do so, supports a pretext inference.
Why It Matters
This decision protects internal whistleblowers and employee advocates from retaliation, even when employers offer seemingly legitimate explanations for adverse actions. The court’s treatment of pretext demonstrates that administrative explanations developed post-hoc during litigation, if withheld from the affected employee, will be viewed skeptically. The case also reinforces that employers cannot rely solely on generic nondiscriminatory reasons when similarly situated employees were treated more favorably or when the employer had opportunity to correct an error but failed to do so with respect to the complaining employee.
For employers, the decision underscores the importance of contemporaneous documentation and consistent application of policies. The disparity between how Malaer’s and Day’s situations were handled—one corrected, one not—created the evidentiary foundation for a jury to infer discriminatory intent despite the administrative-error defense. The case proceeds to trial where Day must ultimately prove that retaliation was a motivating factor in the College’s decision, but the court’s denial of summary judgment indicates sufficient evidence exists to allow a jury to reach that conclusion.