Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Aneth Margarita Ramirez, a Venezuelan citizen, entered the United States on December 4, 2021, and was issued a Notice to Appear on December 8, 2021. She was released on parole and had previously been granted Temporary Protected Status. Initial removal proceedings were terminated by joint motion on January 31, 2024. When Ramirez appeared for a scheduled ICE check-in appointment in January 2026, she was detained. New removal proceedings were initiated on January 29, 2026. She has now been detained for approximately six months without a hearing to determine whether she poses a flight risk or danger to the community.
Ramirez petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging her detention as a violation of the Due Process Clause. The government argued that she is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that her due-process claims lack merit. The government did not contest the material facts alleged by Ramirez, including that she has lived in the United States for over four years and had previously been released after officials determined she posed neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), as applied to Ramirez, violates procedural due process. Applying the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court found that all factors weighed in Ramirez’s favor. First, Ramirez has a protected liberty interest in freedom from detention because she has lived in the United States for over four years and established substantial connections in the country—distinguishing her from aliens seeking initial entry. Second, the government provided no procedures for notice, opportunity to be heard, or individualized assessment of danger or flight risk, creating a high risk of erroneous deprivation that could be remedied through bond hearings. Third, the government failed to articulate any interest in detention or demonstrate that Ramirez posed a danger or flight risk, and any general interest in enforcing the statute cannot overcome constitutional protections.
The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim, which upheld a facial challenge to § 1226(c) detention of criminal aliens, finding it inapplicable to this as-applied challenge. Demore involved detainees who had received criminal procedural protections and Joseph hearings, were detained for an average of only 47 days, and as to whom there was congressional evidence of danger and flight risk. Here, by contrast, Ramirez has received no procedures, faces potentially indefinite detention, and the government has not shown any basis for detention other than the statute’s language. The court also rejected reliance on Thuraissigiam v. Department of Homeland Security, holding that a challenge to detention of someone already in the country with established connections—rather than a challenge to immigration proceedings themselves—does not implicate the sovereign prerogative over entry that Thuraissigiam addressed.
Key Takeaways
- Immigrants with substantial connections to the United States have a protected liberty interest in freedom from detention, distinct from aliens seeking initial entry.
- Procedural due process requires notice, opportunity to be heard, and individualized assessment before civil immigration detention—cannot be bypassed by statutory language alone.
- Mandatory detention statutes that provide no mechanism to determine danger or flight risk violate due process as applied to immigrants already established in the country.
- Courts must conduct as-applied, not merely facial, constitutional review of detention statutes; prior Supreme Court precedent upholding facial challenges does not foreclose as-applied challenges.
Why It Matters
This decision reflects a growing consensus among district courts that procedural due process protections apply to immigration detention, even where statutes appear to mandate detention without regard to individualized factors. The court’s holding that Ramirez’s four years in the country and prior release triggered constitutional protections has significant implications for immigration enforcement policy, particularly following the Fifth Circuit’s recent expansion of § 1225(b)(2) application in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi. The decision suggests that removal of bond-hearing procedures—described in the opinion as having been “routinely provided” by the government until late 2025—may violate due process as applied to long-term residents.
The order requires release within 48 hours and prohibits re-detention without a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge in which the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that Ramirez is a flight risk or danger. This remedy reflects the court’s view that habeas relief requires release where no process is available to test the propriety of detention, particularly given the potentially indefinite length of removal proceedings and the absence of any demonstrated government interest in holding Ramirez in custody.